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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Bills and Notes-Garnishment-Check as Assignment
In a recent federal1 case the holder for value of certain checks was
not allowed a preferred claim as against a creditor of the drawer who garnished the eposit before presentment. The court held that a check
of itself did not work as an assignment of the deposit and that there
were not sufficient facts outside of the actual drawing and delivery of
the checks to constitute one, although the drawer made a deposit the
next day, seemingly to cover the checks. The drawer was a cotton
broker; the checks were issued to purchase cotton; and the deposit
garnished was largely, if not entirely, made up from the proceeds of the
re-sale of the cotton.
Before the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law a minority of the
courts held that a check of itself constituted an assignment, 2 but the
majority ruled otherwise. 3 Some cases held that even though the check
was no assignment as against the 'drawee, it was as between the drawer
and holder. 4 North Carolina was of this class according to Hawes v.
Blackwell.5
Section 189 of the N. I. L.6 incorporated the majority view, although
for a short time after passage of the statute a few courts took the posi'Marx v. Maddrey, 106 F. Supp. 535 (E. D. N. C. 1952).
- Munn v. Burch, 25 I1. 35 (1860) (leading case); Rogers v. Durant, 140
U. S. 298 (1890) ; Industrial Trust v. Weakley, 103 Ala. 458, 15 So. 854 (1894);
Commonwealth v. Kentucky Distilleries, 132 Ky. 521, 116 S. W. 766 (1909);
Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 90 Me. 468, 38 Atl. 374 (1897). See citations collected in 7 Am. JuL., Banks § 532, p. 384 (1937); NORTON, BILLS AND NOTES 584
(4th ed. 1914) ; 2 MORsE, BANKS AND BANKING § 494 n. 1 (6th ed. 1928). Munn
v. Burch, supra, referred to check as assignment and/or contract for the benefit
of payee. Under this minority view the holder was preferred to the garnishing
creditor. Diliman v. Carlen, 105 Wis. 14, 80 N. W. 932 (1899).
'National Bank v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152 (U. S. 1870) (leading case); Ex-

change Bank v. Sutton Bank, 78 Md. 577, 28 Atl. 563 (1894) ; Gramel v. Carmer,
55 Mich. 201, 21 N. W. 418 (1884).
MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING

584, 585 (4th ed. 1914).

§ 493

For extensive collection of citations see 2

n. 1 (6th ed. 1928) ; NORTON, BILLS AND NOTES

'Moore v. Lowery, 25 Iowa 336 (1868) ; Nat. Exchange Bank v. McLoon, 73
Me. 498 (1882) ; Coates v. First Nat. Bank, 91 N. Y. 20 (1883). See citations
in 2 MORSE, BANKS AND BANKING § 495 n. 1 (6th ed. 1928). Mr. Morse is violently
opposed to the old majority rule and that of the N. I. L.
'107 N. C. 196, 12 S. E. 245 (1890).
This decision held that a check, although no assignment as between drawee and payee, was an equitable assignment
pro tanto as between drawer and payee or holder as soon as drawn and delivered.
6 N. C. Gen. Stat. § 25-197 (1943). "A check of itself does not operate as an
assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank,
and the bank is not liable to the holder unless and until it accepts or certifies the
check." (Italics added.)
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tion that it was intended to protect only the drawee bank.7 Thus in
McClain and Norvet v. Torkelson8 the Iowa court held that the holder
of a check acquired a right to the drawn-on deposit superior to that of
a garnishing creditor. However, this holding has been expressly overruled in Iowa.0 The clear weight of authority now supports the view
that under the N. I. L. a check, of itself, -does not have the character
of an assignment, not only as between the holder and drawee, but also
as between the holder and drawer ;.1 an attaching creditor is preferred
to the holder,"1 unless all of the circumstances surrounding the writing
of the check are such that the court can declare it an equitable assign2
ment or can otherwise find exceptions to the provisions of the N. I. L.1
Where there has been a deposit for the specific purpose of meeting
a check, or class of checks, with clear notice or directions to the bank
that the deposit is to be held for this end, some courts have ruled that
the bank holds the deposit in trust,'3 others that there is a specific deposit and that therefore the restrictions of the N. I. L. concerning a
check of itself would not apply and the holder would have a right against
the bank.14 The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that in such
a case there is a trust, and the depositor has a preference to the amount
of the check as against receivers of the insolvent bank and may recover
-for the use of the holder. 16 The court has stated as dictum that the
7

Farrington v. Flemming, 94 Neb. 108, 142 N. W. 297 (1913) ; Elgin v. Gross-

Kelly, 20 N. M. 450, 150 Pac. 922 (1915) ; Glennan v. Rochester Trust, 209 N. Y.

12, 102 N. E. 537 (1913) ; Federal Reserve Bank v. Peters, 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E.
379 (1924) ; Raesser v. Nat. Exchange Bank, 112 Wis. 591, 88 N. W. 618 (1902).
8187 Iowa 202, 174 N. W. 42 (1919).
'Leach
v. Mechanics Savings Bank, 202 Iowa 899, 211 N. W. 506 (1926).
1
Kaesemeyer v. Smith, 22 Idaho 1, 123 Pac. 943 (1912) ; Leach v. Mechanics
Savings Bank, 202 Iowa 899, 211 N. W. 506 (1926) ; Perry v. Bank of Smithfield,
131 N. C. 117, 42 S. E. 551 (1902). See 7 Amt. Jtr., BANKS § 534, pp. 396, 7

(1937).

"Fulton v. Gesterding, 47 Fla. 150, 36 So. 56 (1904) ; Kaesemeyer v. Smith,
22 Idaho 1, 123 Pac. 943 (1912) ; Boswell v. Citizens Savings Bank, 123 Ky. 485,
96 S. W. 797 (1906); Livestock State Bank v. Hise, 150 Minn. 301, 185 N. W.
498 (1921); Wileman v. King, 120 Miss. 392, 82 So. 265 (1919); Jones v.
Crumpler, 119 Va. 143, 89 S. E. 232 (1916).
First Nat. Bank v. Propp, 198 Iowa 809, 200 N. W. 428 (1924) ; Dolph v.
Cross, 153 Iowa 289, 133 N. W. 669 (1911);- Slaughter v. First Nat. Bank, 18
S. W. 2d 754 (Tex. 1929); Hatley v. West Texas Bank, 284 S. W. 540 (Tex.
1926). See Comment, 37 YALE L. J. 626 (1928) ; Notes, 5 A. L. R. 1667 (1920),
50 A. L. R. 403 (1927).
"' Eshbach v. Byers, 164 Ill. App. 449 (1911) ; Foss v. Hume, 130 Me. 32,
153 Atl. 181 (1931) ; Corporation Commission v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co.,
194 N. C. 125, 138 S. E. 530 (1927) ; Morton v. Woolery, 48 N. D. 1132, 189
N. W. 232 (1922); Straus v. Tradesmens Nat. Bank, 36 Hun 451 (N. Y. 1885);
Payne Bros. v. Burnett, 151 Tenn. 496, 269 S. W. 27 (1925) ; Cotulla State Bank
v. Herron, 191 S. W. 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) ; cf. Walker Co. v. Alden, 6 F.
Supp. 262 (E. D. Ill. 1934) (with extensive list of citations p. 264 n. 1). But cf.
Andrew v. Waterville Savings Bank, 205 Iowa 888, 219 N. W. 52 (1928).
" Decatur Creamery v. West Side Bank, 213 Ill. App. 220 (1919) ; First Nat.
Bank v. Barger, 115 S. W. 726 (Ky. 1909); Hitt Fireworks v. Scandinavian Am.
Bank, 114 Wash. 167, 195 Pac. 13 (1922).
'q Corporation Commission v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 194 N. C. 125, 138
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But in General American Life

Insurance Co. v. StadieM,17 where the holder sought recovery, the court
did not apply the trust theory, although the drawer had deposited $21.38
for the specific and sole purpose of meeting the check for $21.38 and
had instructed the agents and employees of the bank that the deposit was
to be held for that sole purpose. The decision stated only that a holder
of an unaccepted check has no action against the bank.'8
Where there is an oral promise to the drawer from the bank that
certain checks will be paid, the courts have often allowed the holder recovery against the bank on the theory that he is beneficiary of a contract for the benefit of a third party.10 The North Carolina court refused to apply this theory in Brantley v. Collie.20 Although a valid contract between the drawer and the drawee for the benefit of the payee was
conceded, the court held that such a contract gave the payee no action
against the bank.21 The court apparently decided that the N. I. L. did
not allow the payee of an unaccepted check rights against the bank no
matter what the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the check.

S. E. 530 (1927). The case leads a collection of authorities in Note, 57 A. L. R.
386 (1927). See also Notes, 10 N. C. L. REv. 381 (1932), 13 N. C. L. REv. 209
(1935).
I8 Corporation Commission v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 193 N. C. 696, 700,
138 S. E. 22, 24 (1927). This is based on the doctrine set out in Morton v.
Woolery, 48 N. D. 1132, 189 N. W. 232 (1922). See note 13 supra.
17223 N. C. 49, 25 S. E. 2d 202 (1943).
"- The court relies for authority on the rule (now uniform) in Cincinnati H. &
D. R. P. v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank, 54 Ohio St. 60 (1896) that a check of itself
is no assignment of drawer's funds in drawee bank, and that the bank is not liable
to the holder until acceptance. This rule should not be controlling, if indeed it is
at all applicable, here where we have circumstances outside of the check itself to
consider. The court did not mention specific deposit.
(1913) is the case
1"Ballard v. Home Nat. Bank, 91 Kan. 91, 136 Pac. 935
most cited for this doctrine, although it is not clear that the court did not base
its decision on equitable assignment. The drawer was a livestock dealer. The
bank agreed he could draw checks on it to buy livestock, provided he would deposit the re-sale proceeds in time to cover the checks. The bank applied these
deposits to a pre-existing debt of the drawer. The payee of one of these checks
sued the bank and recovered. The court ruled that the holder recovered on the
basis of the entire transaction, rather than the promise alone. It was not required
that the payee know of the contract for his benefit. In Saylors v. State Bank, 99
Kan. 515, 163 Pac. 454 (1917) the facts were almost the same, except that the
bank got 8% interest on the resale proceeds and $3 per car-load of livestock bought
and sold. It was held that the payee, as beneficiary of the agreement, could recover from the bank. See also Goeken v. Bank, 100 Kan. 177, 163 Pac. 636
(1917), connected case, 104 Kan. 370, 179 Pac. 321 (1919) ; Singer v. Citizens
Bank, 79 Okla. 267, 193 Pac. 41 (1920) ; Webster v. First State Bank, 46 S. D.
460, 193 N. W. 675 (1923). These cases were applications of the third party
beneficiary doctrine announced in Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
20205 N. C. 229, 171 S. E. 88 (1933).
21 The court distinguished the Ballard and Saylors cases, note 20 supra, saying
that there the bank was interested in the livestock purchased by the drawer from
the holder. Though there was specified consideration of extra commission to the
bank in the Saylors case, the bank appears to have had no greater interest in
the Ballard case or most of the other cases decided on the same theory than did the
bank in the instant case. See Comment, 46 YALE L. J. 483 (1937). The distinction
does not seem a real one.
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In either of the situations previously discussed, or where there is a
combination of the two,2 2 courts have sometimes labeled the legal result
an "equitable assignment."' 3 This term is also applied to the relationship of rights that results, from an understanding, express or implied,
between the drawer and payee which shows an intent to assign the debt
of the drawee bank (the deposit).24 However, this is only an assignment as between drawer and payee and does not necessarily give the
holder a right against the bank unless the bank is a mere stakeholder
and has had notice of the agreement.2v
Even if a court allows a holder a right against the bank or its receivers, it is not settled whether he will be preferred to a garnishing
creditor. Dolph v. Cross2 6 held that since the drawee could not apply
First Nat.
22 The combination seems to be the most common situation.
Bank v. Prikett, 19 Ala. App. 204, 95 So. 920 (1923) (special deposit) ; Wilson
v. Dawson, 52 Ind. 513 (1876) (must use for specific purpose); Moravek v.
First Nat. Bank, 119 Kan. 84, 237 Pac. 921 (1925) (bank cannot appropriate deposit to its own claim) ; Joy v. Grasse, 173 Minn. 289, 217 N. W. 365 (1927) ;
York v. Farmers Bank, 105 Mo. App. 127, 79 S. W. 968 (1904) (privity between
bank and holder); Central Coal & Coke v. State Bank, 226 Mo. App. 594, 44
S. W. 2d 188 (1931) (bank's carrying account in general ledger mere matter of
bookkeeping) ; Paige v. Springfield Nat. Bank, 12 Ohio App. 196 (1919) (specific
deposit, cannot use to pay other checks) ; Re Warren's Bank, 209 Wis. 121, 244
N. W. 594 (1932) (bank held agent of depositor, had no title).
These cases (this footnote and note 20 supra) almost all arise out of agreements to finance agricultural marketing. They are generally referred to as "The
Livestock Cases." See Comment, 46 YALE L. J. 483 (1937).
" Few v. First Nat. Bank, 40 Ga. App. 791, 151 S. E. 456 (1930) (specific
deposit); Manget v. Nat. City Bank, 168 Ga. 876, 149 S. E. 213 (1929) (specific
deposit); Guaranty State Bank v. Summer, 278 S. W. 459 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925) (specific deposit and agreement) ; Boyle v. Vivian State Bank, 55 S. D. 441,
226 N. W. 579 (1929) semble; Ballard v. Home Nat. Bank, 91 Kan. 91, 136 Pac.
935 (1913) semble.
IFourth Street Nat. Bank v. Yardley, 165 U. S. 634 (1897) (leading case).
Here the drawer, having insufficient funds to settle a clearing house debt, told
payee that it had $25,000 on deposit with its New York correspondent, the drawee,
showing a statement in proof. The court held this sufficient for an equitable assignment pro tanto, so payee was entitled to a preference as against receiver of the
drawer, which had gone insolvent. Dunlap v. Commercial Bank, 50 Cal. 476,
195 Pac. 688 (1920) ; First Nat. Bank v. O'Byrne, 117 Ill. App. 473 (1913) ; Hove
v. Stanhope Bank, 138 Iowa 39, 115 N. W. 476 (1908); First Nat. Bank v.
Rogers-Admundson-Flynn, 151 Minn. 243, 186 N. W. 575 (1922); Merchants
Nat. Bank v. State Bank, 172 Minn. 24, 214 N. W. 750 (1927) ; Muller v. King,
209 N. Y. 239, 103 N. E. 138 (1913) ; Boyle v. Vivian State Bank, 55 S. D. 441, 226
N. W. 579 (1929); Austin v. Public Nat. Bank, 2 S. W. 2d 463 (Tex 1928).
-6In Fourth Street Nat. Bank v. Yardley, 165 U. S. 634 (1897) the court held
that it is an equitable assignment pro tanto as against the drawer, any mere
volunteers, and persons charged with notice. In First Nat. Bank v. RogersAdmundson-Flynn, 151 Minn. 243, 186 N. W. 575 (1922) it was held that there
was an assignment as between drawer and payee and payee was allowed recovery
against drawee who had ample notice of the assignment. In Merchants Nat. Bank
v. State Bank, 172 Minn. 24, 28, 214 N. W. 750, 752 (1927) the court states that
"as between drawer and payee the check (in question) operates as an equitable
assignment, and, after receiving notice of the intention and purpose of the parties,
the bank must comply with the directions of the drawer, if it can do so without
prejudice to its own rights ...."
133 N. W. 669 (1911); cf. First Nat. Bank v. Propp, 198
26 153 Iowa 289,
Iowa 809, 200 N. W. 428 (1924) (specific deposit). Contra: Mayer v. Chattahoochee Bank, 51 Ga. 325 (1874).
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a specific deposit to its own claim against the drawer, creditors garnishing the deposit would be excluded as they could rise no higher than the
bank itself were it a creditor.2 7

If it is decided that the facts constitute

an equitable assignment, then it is probable the holder, as "owner" of
part of the deposit, will be preferred to garnishing creditors before presentment, even though there has been no notice to the bank before the
garnishment proceedings.2 8 In the recent case of Lipe v. Bank,20 the
North Carolina court held there was an assignment as between the depositor and his assignee, and title passed without notice to the debtor
bank. But no check was involved, and there was an express assignment. Whether the court would apply this reasoning where the facts
attending the drawing and 'delivery of a check showed an intent to assign is yet to be seen.
The non-assignment rule of the N. I. L. has resulted in many injustices to check holders, not only in the cases of the bank's insolvency
or garnishment of the drawer's account, but also where the drawer dies
or himself goes insolvent before presentment.30 Most courts have recognized this and have tried to qualify the N. I. L. whenever the facts allow,
but the law on this point is confused since the situations naturally overlap
and the courts are not precise in the use of theories they employ. However, the North Carolina court seems to regard it as good policy to protect the drawee bank at all costs. Otherwise it is difficult to explain
why it -did not apply the trust theory in the Stadiem case or the third
party beneficiary theory in the Brantley case. The court seems to take
the position that the N. I. L. precludes their considering special circum"Where the court holds a trust, in theory the garnishing creditor would again
be excluded since the garnishee bank would no longer be the debtor of the depositor. Bul a court might not be willing to extend the trust theory this far.
"A great majority of the courts hold that an assignment of the debt, before
garnishment proceedings, even where no notice is given to the debtor before the
garnishment, gives a -jreference to the assignee. Walters & Walker v. Whitlock,
9 Fla. 89 (1860) ; Walton v. Horkan, 112 Ga. 814, 38 S. E. 105 (1901) ; McDowell
v. Hopfield, 148 Md. 84, 128 Atl. 742 (1925) ; Schoolfield v. Hirsh, 71 Miss. 55,
14 So. 528 (1893) ; Market Nat. Bank v. Raspberry, 34 Okia. 243, 124 Pac. 758
(1912). Intervention in the garnishment proceedings is all the notice necessary.
Hall v. Kansas City Terra Cotta Co.. 97 Kan. 103, 154 Pac. 210 (1916). In
Slaughter v. First Nat. Bank, 18 S. W. 2d 754 (Tex. 1929) there was a clear
agreement between the drawer and payee that proceeds of the re-sale of the livestock (paid for with the check in question) would be deposited with the drawee
to meet the check. The court held that the check, when given under such circumstances, was an equitable assignment of the amount of the deposit necessary
to meet it. Hence payee had rights to the deposit superior to those of a garnishing creditor. The court also held that notice, of the agreement to the bank was
unnecessary since the decision was based on equitable assignment and not on deposit for a specific purpose.
2- 236 N. C. 328, 72 S. E. 2d 759 (1952).
30 This should be particularily apparent in North Carolina, where a tobacco
grower, for instance, could lose the proceeds of a large part or even all of his
year's crop. See excellent discussion of the injustices and inequities of the nonassignment rule in Comment, 60 YALE L. J. 1007 (1951) ; also Feezer, Death of a
Drawer of a Check, 14 MIIN. L. Ray. 124 (1929).
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stances outside the actual drawing and delivery of a check, apparently
attaching no significance whatever to the words "check of itself' in the
statute. 31 The new Uniform Commercial Code has dealt directly with
this problem and, if adopted in North Carolina, will expressly overrule
this position of the court.32 It does not appear that a case has arisen
in this state wherein a holder sought preference over a garnishing creditor where the surrounding facts show an intent to appropriate the 'de-,
posit to the payment of the outstanding check. When such a case is
presented, it is hoped the court will be less reluctant to allow the action
since the drawee bank would be actually a mere stakeholder.

J.

ALLEN ADAMS, JR.

Criminal Law-Suspension of Sentence
Although early decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court held
the suspended sentence illegal,' in 1894 the Court gave its complete
approval to this type of judgment. 2 Subsequent decisions have held
that the power to suspend the imposition (the pronouncing of the terms
of punishment) or execution (the putting into effect of the punishment as
pronounced) of sentence in a criminal case is within the inherent powers
of a court.3 In addition, the use of the suspended sentence has been ex"' See note 6 supra. Notes, 6 N. C. L.
201 (1930)

REv. 325 (1928) and 8 N. C. L. REV.
take the same attitude.
COmERaciAL CODE § 3-409 (Official Draft 1952).

.'UNIFORM

"DRAFr NOT AN ASSIGNMENT.

(1) A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of any
funds in the hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is not
liable on the instrument until he accepts it.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect any liability in contract, tort or otherwise arising from any letter of credit or other obligation or representation which
is not an acceptance."
The comment states:
"l....
The assignment may, however, appear from other facts, and particularly
from other agreements, express or implied; and when the intent to assign is clear
the check may be the means by which the assignment is effected."
"2. The language of the original section 189 that the drawee is not liable 'to
the holder,' is changed as inaccurate and not intended. . .
"3. Subsection (2) is new. It is intended to make it clear that this section
does not in any way affect any liability which may arise apart from the instrument itself. The drawee who fails to accept may be liable . . . to the holder for
breach of the terms . . . of any . . . agreement by which he is obligated to accept.
He may be liable in tort or upon any other basis because of his representation
that he has accepted, or that he intends to accept. The section leaves unaffected
any liability of any kind apart from the instrument."
It is understood that this new act has been introduced for the first time, in
the current session of the Massachusetts Legislature.
State v. Hatley, 110 N. C. 522, 14 S. E. 751 (1892) ; State v. Bennett, 20 N. C.
170 (1838).
2 State v. Crook, 115 N. C. 760, 20 S. E. 513 (1894).
See Coates, Punishment
for Crime in North Carolina, 17 N. C. L. REV. 205, 215 (1939) ; A Survey of
of Statutory Changes in North Carolinain 1937, 15 N. C. L. Rxv 345 (1937).
The phraseology most often used by our court is "inherent power . . . to
suspend judgment or stay execution." State v. Gibson, 233 N. C. 691, 698, 65
S. E. 2d 508, 513 (1951) ; State v. Stallings, 234 N. C. 265, 66 S. E. 2d 822 (1951) ;
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pressly authorized by statute in all cases except those where the crime of
which the defendant was convicted is punishable by life imprisonment
or death. 4 Consequently the suspended sentence is now very frequently
employed by the courts of this state as a method of introducing greater
flexibility into the administration of the criminal law and reforming a
defendant without actually imprisoning him. 5
Normally the judge must have the defendant's consent, either express or implied, before he can order a suspended sentence. 6 Even without consent, however, imposition of sentence may be set aside until the
next term if no conditions are attached.7 Where an objection is raised
to the suspension and the imposition of conditions, the court should proceed to give final judgment and allow an appeal if one is desired.8
If the defendant accepts the terms of suspension, he waives his right
of appeal on the issue of his guilt or innocence.0
State v. Lewis, 226 N. C. 249, 37 S. E. 2d 691 (1946) ; State v. Jackson, 226 N. C.
66, 36 S. E. 2d 706 (1945) ; State v. Graham, 225 N. C. 217, 34 S. E. 2d 146
(1945). Justice Barnhil pointed out in State v. Miller, 225 N. C. 213, 215, 34
S. E. 2d 143, 144 (1945); "When either judgment or sentence is suspended on
condition, the ultimate purpose is the same."
' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-197 (1943). "After conviction or plea of guilty or
nolo contendere for any offense, except a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, the judge of any court of record with criminal jurisdiction may
suspend the imposition or execution of a sentence and place the defendant on prooation or may impose a fine and also place the defendant on probation." Our
court has exercised this power under two other statutory provisions. Suspension
is authorized under N. C. GFN. STAT. § 14-132 (1943) when the defendant has
been convicted for abandoning his wife or child or both. The purpose of such a
suspension is to provide support for the wife and/or child or children. State v.
Johnson, 230 N. C. 743, 55 S. E. 2d 690 (1949) ; State v. Henderson, 207 N. C.
258, 176 S. E. 758 (1934) ; State v. Vickers, 197 N. C. 62, 147 S. E. 673 (1929).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-7, 8 permit a suspension if the defendant has been convicted for failing to support his illegitimate child. In State v. Bowser, 232 N. C.
414, 416, 61 S. E. 2d 98, 99 (1950) the court held that these two statutes empower
the suspension "of sentences upon condition that offending parents make contributions of money for the maintenance of such children."
' State v. Stallings, 234 N. C. 265, 66 S. E. 2d 822 (1951) ("the more humane
concept.., of punishment") ; State v. Smith, 233 N. C. 68, 62 S. E. 2d 495 (1950) ;
State v. Tripp, 168 N. C. 150, 83 S. E. 630 (1914) (to ameliorate the condition of
the defendant) ; State v. Everitt, 164 N. C. 399, 79 S. E. 274 (1913). "At common law the court could suspend judgment temporarily for some special purpose

such as to allow the defendant time in which to move for a new trial or to show

that he was entitled to the benefit of clergy or to apply for a pardon or to take
some other step in the ordinary procedure of the case." State v. Jackson, 226

N. C. 66, 68, 36 S. E. 2d 706, 707 (1945). For a brief history of suspended
sentences see State v. Everitt, 164 N. C. 399, 402-407, 79 S. E. 274, 275-277 (1913).
6 State v. Jackson, 226 N. C. 66, 36 S. E. 2d 706 (1945) ; State v. Miller, 225
N. C. 213, 34 S. E. 2d 143 (1945) ; State v. Jaynes, 198 N. C. 728, 153 S. E.
410 (1930) ; State v. Burgess, 192 N. C. 668, 135 S. E. 771 (1926).
'State v. Graham, 225 N. C. 217, 34 S. E. 2d 146 (1945) ; State v. Burgess, 192
N. C. 668, 135 S. E. 771 (1926); State v. Griffis, 117 N. C. 709, 23 S. E. 164
(1895).
' State v. Jackson, 226 N. C. 66, 36 S. E. 2d 706 (1945) ; State v. Webb, 209
N. C. 302, 183 S. E. 367 (1935); State v. Jaynes, 198 N. C. 728, 153 S. E. 410
(1930) ; State v. Burgess, 192 N. C. 669, 135 S.E.771 (1926).
' State v. Barnhardt, 230 N. C. 223, 52 S. E. 2d 904 (1949) ; State v. Miller,
225 N. C. 213, 34 S. E. 2d 143 (1945) ; State v. Pelley, 221 N. C. 487, 20 S. E. 2d
850 (1942) ; State v. Ray, 212 N. C. 487, 194 S. E. 472 (1938) ; State v. Henderson,
207 N. C. 258, 176 S. E. 758 (1934).
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During the term at which the defendant was convicted his status
may remain somewhat uncertain. Apparently the trial judge may revoke his decision to suspend and immediately impose punishment; or he
may substitute new or additional terms; it would seem that he may even
decide to release an imprisoned defendant under a suspended execution
of sentence. 10 Once the term has ended, however, the court can make
no further changes in the judgment, nor can it levy any punishment so
long as there is adherence to the condition."
Where a defendant has been released under suspended sentence, the
trial judge has discretionary authority to compel him to appear so that
it can be determined whether the terms of the sentence have been violated. 12 No other officer can exercise this power.' 3 Whether or not

" The original rule was that if the defendant had undergone part of his punishment, then only a sentence in mitigation could be substituted, since it was considered
that any other change would have been subjecting the defendant to punishment
twice for the same offense. State v. Warren, 92 N. C. 825 (1885) ; In re Brittain,
93 N. C. 587 (1885) ; State v. Manly, 95 N. C. 661 (1886) ; State v. Crook, 115
N. C. 760, 20 S. E. 513 (1894). In State v. Whitt, 117 N. C. 804, 23 S. E. 452
(1895), however, the supreme court ostensibly distinguished the Warren case, as
holding merely that a different sentence could not therein be subsequently imposed because the court had revoked the prior sentence. The supreme court
then held that even though the defendant in the case before it had served six days
of the punishment levied, he could be brought before the trial judge and the
sentence could be changed as long as such change was made during the ternz at
which the defendant was convicted. Subsequent cases have followed this general
rule. State v. Stevens, 146 N. C. 679, 61 S. E. 629 (1908) (although defendant
was in jail, change of sentence during term at which he was convicted was proper,
since counsel for defendant had requested that the matter of punishment be kept
in fieri) ; State v. McLamb, 203 N. C. 442, 166 S. E. 507 (1932) (defendant was
in jail with appeal pending, and sentence was raised during, term. Court held
that sentence could not be changed if defendant had undergone even an inconsiderable part of senfence, but determined that he had not yet undergone any punishment) ; State v. Godwin, 210 N. C. 449, 187 S. E. 584 (1936) (proper to increase the amount of imprisonment during term, where no part of imprisonment
had been served). Justice Seawell, in State v. Lewis, 226 N. C. 294, 251, 37
S. E. 2d 691, 693 (1946), declared: "After a defendant has begun the service of
his term, or at least when that takes place after the adjournment of the court,
it is beyond the jurisdiction of the judge to alter it or interfere with it in any
way." The following statement is found in State v. Gross, 230 N. C. 734, 739, 55
S. E. 2d 517, 521 (1949) : "Whether the latter [sentence] was intended to clarify
and render certain the sentence previously given or whether it was intended to
operate independently or supplant the former sentence, we need not inquire. As
the term had not expired the whole matter was in fieri and the right of the judge
to modify, change, alter or amend the prior judgment, or to substitute another
judgment for it, cannot be challenged."
11 State v. Lewis, 226 N. C. 249, 37 S. E. 2d 691 (1946) ; State v. Miller, 225
N. C. 213, 34 S. E. 2d 143 (1945) ; State v. McLeod, 222 N. C. 142, 22 S. E. 223
(1942) ; State v. Rogers, 221 N. C. 462, 20 S. E. 2d 297 (1938) ; State v. Phillips,
185 N. C. 614, 115 S. E. 893 (1923) ; State v. Hilton, 151 N. C. 687, 65 S. E.
10112 (1901).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-200 (1943), State v. Pelley, 221 N. C. 487, 20 S. E.
2d 850 (1942) ; State v. Shepherd, 187 N. C. 609, 122 S. E. 467 (1924) ; State v.
Phillips, 185 N. C. 614, 115 S. E. 893 (1923) ; State v. Greer, 173 N. C. 759, 92
S. E. 149 (1917). The defendant must appear, and if he fails to do so the five year
statute of limitations of the effective duration of conditions imposed stops running. Thus a defendant who fails to appear cannot later claim that the five
year period has run and that therefore the conditions are void. State v. Pelley,
supra.
" Upon finding the defendant guilty of the offense charged and fixing the terms
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there has been a breach is a question of fact for the judge alone to determine, not an issue of fact for the jury.1 4 This finding must be made
in open court, 15 and the state has the burden of showing violation. 10
Such evidence as the state may introduce is not used to punish for any
subsequent offense but rather to determine what punishment to impose
under the original suspension. 17 Unless there is proof showing other18
wise, the finding of the judge is presumed correct.
The means of securing review of a court's decision to reimpose
sentence for violation of conditions varies with the position which such
court occupies in the judicial hierarchy. By virtue of a 1951 amendment, where the sentence is ordered into effect by an inferior court, a
defendant is guaranteed a right of appeal to the superior court for a
hearing de izovo "only upon the issue of whether or not there has been
a violation of the terms of the suspended sentence."' 19 Where the decree
was handed down by the superior court, the defendant's remedy is
limited to applying for a writ of certiorari from the supreme court, 20 alof imprisonment, some judges have directed that capias issue on motion of the
solicitor, or the clerk or the sheriff. This delegation of authority to execute sentence is a procedural error and void. However, this is held to amount to no more
than a delay in the execution of the sentence. Since the time at which execution is
to be imposed is not an essential part of the sentence, such a delegation is considered to be no part of the judgment of the court. Thus the validity of the
sentence is not affected. It re Smith, 218 N. C. 462, 11 S. E. 2d 317 (1940);
State v. McAfee, 189 N. C. 320, 127 S. E. 204 (1925) ; State v. Phillips, 185
N. C. 614, 115 S. E. 893 (1923); State v. Vickers, 184 N. C. 676, 114 S. E. 168
(1922).
"'State v. Marsh, 225 N. C. 648, 36 S. E. 2d 244 (1945) ; State v. Miller, 225
N. C. 213, 34 S. E. 2d 143 (1945) ; State v. Pelley, 221 N. C. 487, 20 S. E. 2d
850 (1942) ; State v. Smith, 196 N. C. 438, 146 S. E. 73 (1928).
1 State v. Rhodes, 208 N. C. 241, 180 S. E. 84 (1935) ; State v. Smith, 196 N. C.
438, 146 S. E. 73 (1928) ; State v. Phillips, 185 N. C. 614, 115 S. E. 893 (1923)
(private determination in chambers is invalid) ; State v. Greer, 173 N. C. 759, 92
See State v.
S. E. 147 (1917) (finding of breach in private office is void).
Bowser, 232 N. C. 414, 416, 61 S. E. 2d 98, 99 (1950).
1.7 State v. Sullivan, 227 N. C. 680, 44 S. E. 2d 81 (1947).
' State v. Pelley, 221 N. C. 487, 20 S. E. 2d 850 (1942); State v. Hardin, 183
N. C. 815, 112 S. E. 593 (1922) ; State v. Everitt, 164 N. C. 399, 79 S. E. 274
(1913).
18 State v. Smith, 233 N. C. 68, 62 S. E. 2d 495 (1950) ; State v. Johnson, 230
N. C. 743, 55 S. E. 2d 690 (1949) ; State v. Everitt, 164 N. C. 399, 79 S. E. 274
(1913) ; State v. Hilton, 151 N. C. 687, 65 S. E. 1011 (1901).
The statute, as read literally,
1" N. C. GEx. STAT. § 15-200.1 (Supp. 1951).
appears to limit the grounds upon which the defendant can contest reimposition
of punishment to the issue of whether there has been a breach of the conditions.
Prior to this amendment, the defendant had to seek recordari to get a review of the
decision of the inferior court and, if this was granted, he could contest the reimposition by attacking the reasonableness of the conditions and sufficiency of the
evidence to support a finding of breach. State v. Stallings, 234 N. C. 265, 66
It would seem, in spite of the literal meaning of the
S. E. 2d 822 (1951).
amendment, that those defenses available under recordari could still be urged on
appeal from an inferior court.
20 State v. Stallings, 234 N. C. 265, 66 S. E. 2d 822 (1951) ; State v. Maples,
232 N. C. 732, 62 S. E. 2d 52 (1950) ; State v. Peterson, 228 N. C. 736, 46 S. E.
2d 852 (1948) ; State v. Farrar, 226 N. C. 478, 38 S. E. 2d 193 (1946) ; State
v. King, 222 N. C. 137, 22 S. E. 2d 241 (1942).

1953]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

though the latter body occasionally deviates from this procedure to hear
cases, though improperly presented by appeal, which it feels might re21
sult in a serious denial of rights.
In seeking certiorari from the supreme court to review the superior
court action there are two grounds upon which a review of the decision
to reimpose punishment may be obtained. The defendant may contest
the decision on the ground that "there is no evidence to support a finding
that the conditions have been breached," 22 or that "the conditions are
unreasonable and unenforceable, or are for an unreasonable length of
time."2
In reality the defendant has little chance of success in attacking the
reasonableness of the conditions, since the trial judge has almost unlimited discretion. Perhaps the only definite limitation on this discretion is that a suspension can be for no longer than five years.2 4 G. S.
15-199 specifically authorizes definite terms of suspension to which the
obedience of the defendant may be commanded, 25 and, in addition, the
1The authority for this action is found in N C. CONST. Art. IV, § 8, State v.
Phillips, 185 N. C. 609, 115 S. E. 893 (1923) ; State v. Tripp, 168 N. C. 150, 83
S. E. 630 (1914).
" State v. Stallings, 234 N. C. 265, 66 S. E. 2d 822 (1951) ; State v. Smith, 233
N. C. 68, 62 S. E. 2d 495 (1950); State v. Robinson, 232 N. C. 418, 61 S. E.
2d 106 (1950) ; State v. Miller, 225 N. C. 213, 34 S. E. 2d 143 (1945) ; State v.
Johnson, 169 N. C. 311, 84 S. E. 2d 767 (1915). See also State v. Sullivan, 227
N. C. 680, 44 S. E. 2d 81 (1947) (facts not sufficient to show that defendant left
training school without permission, that he escaped, broke rules or was not of good
behavior) ; State v. Rogers, 221 N. C. 462, 464, 20 S. E. 2d 297, 298 (1942) (finding
insufficient to show that condition requiring that no woman be allowed to work at
any business place owned or operated by defendant, or at which defendant is
employed, or live on any farm defendant controls unless she resides "with
mentally competent male members of her family" was violated) ; State v. Hardin,
183 N. C. 815, 112 S. E. 593 (1922) (possession of 150 gallons of wine is only
prima facie evidence of guilt and not a sufficient finding of breach-finding insufficient if it only permits an inference of breach).
" State v. Stallings, 234 N. C. 265, 66 S. E. 2d 822 (1951) ; State v. Smith, 233
N. C. 68, 62 S. E. 2d 495 (1950) ; State v. Robinson, 232 N. C. 418, 61 S. E. 2d
106 (1950) ; State v. Miller, 225 N. C. 213, 34 S. E. 2d 143 (1945) ; State v.
Shepherd, 187 N. C. 609, 122 S. E. 467 (1924).
2' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-200 (1943) ; State v. Gibson, 233 N. C. 691, 65 S. E.
2d 508 (1951) (suspension for ten years is invalid). The terms of suspension
may run for five years even though punishment for the offense is less. State v.
Stallings, 234 N. C. 265, 66 S. E. 2d 822 (1951) ; State v. Miller, 225 N. C. 213,
34 S. E. 2d 143 (1945). However, five years is the maximum no matter what the
authorized term of imprisonment may be. State v. Wilson, 216 N. C. 130, 4 S. E.
2d 440 (1939). Prior to 1937, the only restriction on the effective duration of
conditions imposed was that they be "for a determinate period and for a reasonable length of time." State v. Gibson, 233 N. C. 691, 698, 65 S. E. 2d 508, 513
(1951); State v. Miller, 225 N. C. 213, 215, 34 S. E. 2d 143, 145 (1945). An
indefinite suspension was illegal. State v. Hilton, 151 N. C. 687, 65 S. E. 1011
(1909).
""(a)
Avoid injurious or vicious habits; (b) Avoid persons or places of disreputable or harmful character; (c) Report to the probation officer as directed;
(d) Permit the probation officer to visit at his home or elsewhere; (e) Work
faithfully at suitable employment as far as possible; (f) Remain within a specified
area; (g) Pay a fine in one or several sums as directed by the court; (h) Make
reparation or restitution to the aggrieved party for the damage or loss caused by
his offense, in an amount to be determined by the court; (i) Support his dependants." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-199 (1943).
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statute permits "any other."'26 Some of the conditions to which the court
has required obedience are: "not to violate [the] prohibition laws for
two years, '27 not to drive a car for one year and to drive during the next
year only if the probation officer so recommends, 28 "not to talk about
young girls in any way except complimentary remarks,"2 9 to pay a
worthless check and the costs of the action,3 0 to be committed to a
training school and remain of good behavior and obedient to the rules,8 '
to "apply himself to [a] legitimate, gainful occupation" and "support
and maintain his wife and minor child or children according to his rea83
'3 2
to pay $10.00 per week to support a minor child,
sonable ability,
to cease publication of material pertaining to stock sales, 4 to appear for
twelve months on the first Tuesday of each month and show good behavior, 35 to appear for two years at every term of criminal court and
prove that he has been law abiding, 6 to "avoid persons and places of
disreputable or harmful character," 8 7 and to refrain from libel or
slander 8 8 If, however, the conditions attached conflict with the defendent's right of appeal as to the validity of the conditions, the entire
judgment is void. 9
Perhaps the condition most commonly attached is that of "good behavior,"' 40 which has been defined as "conduct conforming to law." 41
One writer suggests that this presents the question whether a violation
of the federal penal code is just as much a breach of this stipulation as
is an infraction of the North Carolina criminal law. 42 Some cases have
held that only local law is contemplated, 43 but it seems that it would

"N.
STAT. § 15-199 (1943).
'T StateC.v.GEN.
Stallings,
234 N. C. 265, 266, 66 S.E. 2d 822, 823 (1951).
28 State v. Smith, 233 N. C. 68, 62 S. E. 2d 495 (1950).
20

State v. Smith, 196 N. C. 438, 146 S.E. 73, 74 (1929).

State v. White, 230 N. C. 513, 53 S. E. 2d 436 (1949).
"State v. Sullivan, 227 N. C. 680, 44 S.E. 2d 81 (1947).
32 State v. Lewis, 226 N. C. 249, 251, 37 S. E. 2d 691, 693 (1946).
"State v. Johnson, 231 N. C. 743, 55 S. E. 2d 690 (1949).
"State v. Pelley, 221 N. C. 487, 20 S.E. 2d 850 (1942).
"State v. Tripp, 168 N. C. 150, 83 S.E. 630 (1914).
"State v. Everitt, 164 N. C. 399, 79 S. E. 274 (1913).
'r State v. Cagle, 221 N. C. 131, 19 S. E. 2d 134 (1942).
"State v. Sanders, 153 N. C. 624, 69 S. E. 272 (1910).
" State v. Calcutt, 219 N. C. 545, 15 S.E. 2d 9 (1941). The conditions, as read
literally, were such that if the defendant wished to appeal the judgment he could
not comply with two of the terms because they contained a time element requiring immediate performance. Two justices, in dissent, argued that, pending appeal,
the conditions of suspension were stayed, the time element was in abeyance, and
thus there was no conflict.
"' See e.g., State v. Gibson, 233 N. C. 691, 65 S. E. 2d 508 (1951) ; State v.
Peterson, 228 N. C. 736, 46 S. E. 2d 852 (1948); State v. Sullivan, 227 N. C.
680, 44 S.E. 2d 81 (1947) ; State v. Lewis, 226 N. C. 249, 37 S.E. 2d 691 (1946);
State v. Marsh, 225 N. C. 648, 36 S.E. 2d 244 (1945).
" State v. Pelley, 221 N. C. 487, 499, 20 S. E. 2d 850, 858 (1942) ; State v.
Gooding, 194 N. C. 271, 272, 139 S. E. 436, 437 (1927); State v. Hardin, 183
N. C. 815, 818, 112 S. E. 593, 594 (1922).
"Note, 1 N. C. L. Rav. 116 (1922).
" State v. Gooding, 194 N. C. 271, 139 S.E. 436 (1927) ; State v. Hardin, 183
N. C. 815, 112 S. E. 593 (1922).
20
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be better to include both the federal and state laws. 44 Of course the obvious way to avoid this problem is for the judge to expressly state that
"no State or Federal penal laws" shall be violated.4 5
Because the defendant must consent to a suspended sentence, the
court may require some conditions which would be of doubtful legality
if enforced in a direct sentence. Thus, although alternative judgments
are void, 46 a suspended sentence (the practical effect of which is to give
the -defendant a choice between freedom or jail) is not alternative albeit
the suspension requires payment of a fine and adherence to certain stip47
ulations.
Enforcement of the punishment which has been suspended after the
defendant has agreed to reimburse and has reimbursed private prosecutors for attorney's fees is not double punishment,48 nor is imposition
of sentence after payment of costs.9 A sentence suspended on condition that defendant leave the county or state and remain away is not a
void sentence of banishment, but rather a matter of voluntary exile.50
It is not uncommon for the court to require as a term of suspension
that the defendant pay damages to the party he has injured. 51 This,
in effect, results in the settlement of a potential civil action in a criminal
proceeding. 52 In a recent case, just such a compensation provision
caused the defendant to raise the question of imprisonment for debt.
" Note, 1 N. C. L. REV. 116 (1922) (the federal law is equally effective in
governing a citizen in North Carolina).
"See State v. Cagle, 221 N. C. 131, 19 S. E. 2d 134 (1942).
"A judgment "for one thing or another" which makes its enforcement a matter
of the discretion of the court is void. The judgment must be such that it can be
enforced by ministerial action. State v. Wilson, 216 N. C. 130, 133, 4 S. E. 2d
440, 443 (1939). See also State v. Hatley, 110 N. C. 522, 14 S. E. 751; In re
Deaton, 105 N. C. 59, 11 S. E. 244 (1890) ; Strickland v. Cox, 102 N. C. 410, 9

S. E. 414 (1889).
"7This type suspension is specifically sanctioned by N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-197
(1943), State v. Pelley, 221 N. C. 487, 20 S. E. 2d 850 (1942) (fine and suspension

on terms not alternative) ; State v. Wilson, 216 N. C. 130, 4 S. E. 2d 440 (1939)
(fine and suspension on condition that defendant remain law abiding not alternative).
" State v. Hardin, 183 N. C. 815, 112 S. E. 593 (1922) (this was held to be defendant's own agreement and therefore no part of the judgment).
" State v. Cornett, 197 N. C. 627, 150 S. E. 113 (1929) (costs constitute no part
of the punishment) ; State v. Smith, 196 N. C. 438, 146 S. E. 73 (1928) ; State
v. Crook, 115 N. C. 760, 21 S. E. 513 (1894).
See Note, 1 N. C. L. REv. 116

(1922).
50 In re Hinson, 156 N. C. 250, 72 S. E. 320 (1911) (leave the county) ; State
v. Hatley, 110 N. C. 522, 14 S. E. 751 (1892) (leave the state). The reasoning
is that the defendant is not being forced to leave; he may stay if he wishes, but if
he does it means going to jail. For further discussion see Note, 8 N. C. L. Rxv.
465 (1930).
"This practice is authorized by N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-199 (1943), State v.
Marsh, 225 N. C. 648, 36 S. E. 2d 244 (1945); State v. Ray, 212 N. C. 748, 191
S. E. 840 (1937).
"See Note, 10 N. C. L. REV. 389 (1932) upholding this result.
"State v. Simmington, 235 N. C. 612, 70 S. E. 2d 842, 843 (1952) ("Execution
was suspended . . . upon condition that he pay . . . $711.50 for the use of named
persons, said sum to be paid $60 cash and the balance at the rate of $20 per
month").

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

The supreme court agreed that there could not be confinement for
failing to pay the damages, 54 but then pointed out that this was imprisonment for failing to comply with the conditions of suspension, a criminal
offense.5
With the broad discretion allowed him by the supreme court, both in
his decision as to whether suspension should be allowed, and in his 'determination of proper conditions for suspension, the trial judge has a
valuable corrective device at his disposal. Care should be exercised in
granting suspension, however, only in cases where there is reasonable
likelihood that the defendant will reform; otherwise the release of the
defendant merely offers him another opportunity to endanger society.
MORTON L. UNION

Dedication-Prerequisites of Private Rights Arising Therefrom
. In the case of a sale of lots by reference to a map or plat upon
which streets, alleys, parks, or other areas are indicated apparently for
public use, two distinct rights may arise in such areas. They are: (1)
a public right in the general public to have the areas kept open, and (2)
a private right in the individual purchasers of lots to enforce the obligation.1 The North Carolina Supreme Court refers to each right as a
dedication, although the latter is more properly termed an easement.'
Prerequisites for the arising of the two rights are different.8 The in"' This rule has been established in Myers v. Barnhardt, 202 N. C. 49, 161

S. E.715 (1931) ; State v. Whitt, 117 N. C. 804, 23 S.E. 452 (1895) ; State v.
Warren, 92 N. C. 825 (1885).
" State v. Simmington, 235 N. C. 612, 614, 70 S. E.2d 842, 844 (1952).

The

court ruled that if the condition had been that the defendant post a bond to insure
payment of damages, the condition would have been satisfied when the bond was
posted. Thereafter, the defendant could not be forced to pay the bond by criminal
action since that would be tantamount to imprisonment for debt. The only remedy
would be a civil action to collect on the bond. See Myers v. Barnhardt, 202 N. C.
49, 161 S. E. 715 (1931).
1 The existence of the two rights is recognized in the following cases: Barnes
v. Cheek, 84 Ga. App. 653, 67 S. E. 2d 145 (1951); Kelsoe v. Mayor and Town
Council of Oglethorpe, 120 Ga. 951, 48 S. E. 366 (1904); Smith v. City of
Hollister, 238 S. W. 2d 457 (Mo. App. 1951); Rowe v. City of Durham, 235
N. C. 158, 69 S. E. 2d 171 (1952); Lee v. Walker, 234 N. C. 687, 68
S. E. 2d 664 (1951); Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N. C. 227, 25 S. E. 2d
889 (1943) ; Gault v. Town of Waccamaw, 200 N. C. 593, 158 S. E. 104 (1931) ;
Irwin v. City of Charlotte, 193 N. C. 109, 136 S. E. 368 (1927) ; Wittson v.
Dowling, 179 N. C. 542, 103 S. E. 18 (1920) ; Hughes v. Clark, 134 N. C. 457, 46
S. E. 956 (1904).
"'There is no such thing as the dedication of property to private use." A. F.
Hutchinson Land Co. v. Whitehead Bros. Co., 127 Misc. 558, 217 N. Y. S. 413,
417 (Sup. Ct. 1926), aff'd 218 App. Div. 682, 219 N. Y. S. 413 (3d Dep't 1926).
See also 16 Am. Jup., DEDIcATiox § 2.
' To effect a common law dedication to public uses, there must exist: (1) intention of the donor to dedicate, and (2) acceptance by the public. People v.
Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 226 P. 2d 702 (1951); Atlantic Ry. v. Sweatman,
81 Ga. App. 269, 58 S. E. 2d 553 (1950) ; Egner v. Livingston County Board of
Education, 313 Ky. 168, 230 S. W. 2d 448 (1950) ; Chene v. City of Detroit, 262
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quiry here will be confined to the prerequisites giving rise to the private
right.
The general rule is that "where streets and roads are marked on a
plat and lots are bought and sold with reference to the map or plat, all
who buy with reference to the general scheme disclosed by the plat or
map acquire a right to all the public ways designated thereon and may
enforce the dedication." 4
The rule is based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The theory
is that the grantor, in making a sale of land 5 by reference to a plat on
which are marked public ways, induces purchasers to believe that the
ways will be kept open for their benefit, and it would be unjust for the
grantor to thereafter deny the right to privileges implied from his own
conduct.6 While the requirements of the rule seem to be set out clearly
as, (1) a sale with reference to a map or plat, (2) on which are marked
Mich. 253, 247 N. W. 172 (1933) ; Smith v. City of Hollister, 238 S. W. 2d 457
(Mo. App. 1951) ; Dowd v. City of Cincinnati, 152 Ohio St. 152, 87 N. E. 2d 243
(1949).

To effect an easement under the rule here discussed there is no need for an
acceptance. Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N. C. 227, 25 S.E. 2d 889 (1943) ; Home
Real Estate Loan and Ins. Co. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 216 N. C. 778, 7
S. E. 2d 13 (1939); Wheeler v. Consolidated Construction Co., 170 N. C. 427,
87 S.E. 221 (1915) ; Hughes v. Clark, 134 N. C. 457, 46 S. E. 956 (1904).
It would seem, also, that an actual intent on the part of the grantor to make
a dedication is not necessary to effect the private right when it is considered that
the rule is applied, as will later appear, as an equitable estoppel. The elements
of an equitable estoppel are conduct, acts, language, or silence amounting to a
representation or a concealment of material facts, and the party claiming the
estoppel must have so acted on it that he would be prejudiced if the first party be
permitted to deny the facts to be as represented. Boddie v. Bond, 154 N. C. 359,
70 S.E. 824 (1911).
Thus it appears that an intent on behalf of the first party that the facts be as
represented is not an element of equitable estoppel. In fact, it would be more
accurate to say that in most cases of equitable estoppel, the party against whom
it is held to operate did not intend the facts to be as represented by him.
' ELLiorr, RoADS AND STREETS, § 132, (4th ed. 1926) ; Gaither v. Albermarle
Hospital, Inc., 235 N. C. 431, 443, 70 S.E. 2d 680, 690 (1952) ; Home Real Estate
Loan & Ins. Co. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 216 N. C. 778, 786, 7 S.E. 2d 13,
19 (1939); Stephens Co. v. Myers Park Homes Co., 181 N. C. 335, 340, 107
S. E. 233, 236 (1921); Elizabeth City v. Commander, 176 N. C. 26, 30, 96
S. E. 736 (1918) ; Hughes v. Clark, 134 N. C. 457, 462, 46 S E. 956, 958 (1904);
Collins v. Asheville Land Co., 128 N. C. 563, 566, 39 S E. 21, 22 (1901).
Although not quoting directly from ELLIOTT, op. cit. supra, other North Carolina cases have stated the rule in substantially the same way. See Rowe v. City
of Durham, 235 N. C. 158, 69 S. E. 2d 171 (1952); Lee v. Walker, 234 N. C.
687, 68 S. E. 2d 664 (1951); Russell v. Coggin, 232 N. C. 674, 62 S. E. 2d 70
(1950) ; Evans v. Horne, 226 N. C. 581, 39 S. E. 2d 612 (1946) ; Foster v. Atwater, 226 N. C. 472, 38 S. E. 2d 316 (1946).
'The sale of a single lot in reference to the plat is sufficient to invoke the rule.
See Wittson v. Dowling, 179 N. C. 542, 545, 103 S. E. 18, 19 (1920).
' Gaither v. Albermarle Hospital, Inc., 235 N. C. 431, 70 S. E. 2d 680 (1952);
Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N. C. 227, 25 S. E. 2d 889 (1943); Home Real
Estate Loan & Ins. Co. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 216 N. C. 778, 7 S. E. 2d

13 (1940); Irwin v. City of Charlotte, 193 N. C. 109, 136 S. E. 368 (1926);
Stephens Co. v. Myers Park Homes Co., 181 N. C. 335, 107 S. E. 233 (1921) ;
Wittson v. Dowling, 179 N. C. 542, 103 S.E. 18 (1920).
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public ways ;7 still, a proper appraisal of these requirements can only be
made in the light of this reason behind the rule.
As to the first requirement, it seems indisputable that unless the
grantor at some time, in some way, calls the map to the attention of the
grantee, nothing on the map can be said to have been used as an inducement for the purchase. However, must the reference to the map be
made in the instrument of conveyance, or is it sufficient that a reference
to it be made in the negotiations? Some writers seem to think that the
courts, in referring to a "sale" by reference to a map or plat, mean a
sale followed by a conveyance which also makes reference to the plat ;8
but North Carolina does not require a reference to the plat in the deed if
there is reference to the plat in the negotiations for the sale. 9 Nor is it
necessary that the plat to which reference is made be recorded. 10 However, if the reference to the map is not incorporated in the purchaser's
deed, the grantee may lose his rights thereunder in the event his grantor
later sells land embracing the -dedicated areas to a third person who has
no notice, either actual or constructive, of the unrecorded plat."
The second requirement of the rule concerns the plat itself; that is,
what it must contain before purchasers are allowed an easement in areas
shown thereon. The rule speaks of purchasers acquiring a right in
public ways which are "marked" or "designated" on the map or plat.
All of the North Carolina cases, prior to the recent one of Gaither v.
Albernmarle Hospital, Inc.,1 2 have involved plats on which the areas in
dispute are actually marked "court," "street," "alleyway," etc.' 3
'The quotation from ELLiroT, op. cit. supra note 4, § 132 is, of course, mainly
concerned with public ways, but there is no reason to make any distinction, for
the purposes of the rule, between cases where the benefit is obtained from using
the areas as means of passing to other enjoyments and where the benefit is the
enjoyment of the areas themselves.
The same rule applies to pieces of land marked on the plat or map as squares,
courts, parks. Conrad v. West End Hotel & Land Co., 126 N. C. 776, 36 S. E.
282 (1900). See Foster v. Atwater, 226 N. C. 472, 473, 38 S. E. 2d 316, 318
(1946) ; Wittson v. Dowling, 179 N. C. 542, 544, 103 S. E. 18, 19 (1920) ; Sexton
v. Elizabeth City, 169 N. C. 385, 390, 86 S. E. 344, 346 (1915); Green v.
Miller 161 N. C. 24, 30, 76 S. E. 505, 507 (1912); Hughes v. Clark, 134 N. C.
457, 460, 46 S. E. 956, 957 (1904).
1 See 3 TiFYANY, REAL PROPERTY § 800 (3rd ed. 1939) ; Note, 7 A. L. R. 2d 612

(1949).

'Green v. Miller, 161 N. C. 24, 76 S. E. 505. See Milliken v. Denny, 135
N. C. 19, 22, 47 S. E. 132, 133 (1904) where the court said that "the references
either in the deed or it; the negotiations estops the party" [italics added].
Somersette v. Stanaland, 202 N. C. 685, 163 S. E. 804 (1932); Collins v.
Asheville Land Co., 128 N. C. 563, 39 S. E. 21 (1901)
"1Green v. Miller, 161, N. C. 24. 76 S. E. 505 (1912).
12235 N. C. 431, 70 S. E. 2d 680 (1952).
("Carolina Street");
1" Evans v. Home, 226 N. C. 581, 39 5S.E. 2d 612 (1946)
Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N. C. 227, 25 S. E. 2d 889 (1943) ("16-foot strip..
designated '11 ft. alley"') ; Home Real Estate Loan and Ins. Co. V. Town of
Carolina Beach, 216 N. C. 778, 7 S. E. 2d 13 (1939) ("Lake Park Boulevard,
. . . shown to be of the width of ninty-nine feet, including the strip of land
in question") ; Wittson v. Dowling, 179 N. C. 542, 103 S. E. 18 (1920) ("certain
open spaces between the lots, marked 'alleyways,' and another open space 50 feet
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" 205

In the Gaithercase, the owner of lands along a navigable stream had
the property surveyed and a plat thereof made and recorded. The plat
indicated numerous lots, laid off and numbered, and a street running
along the river with a strip of land, unnumbered and undivided, and
never wider than six feet, lying between the river and the street. Lots
were then sold by reference to the plat and lot numbers. It was held
that the grantor dedicated to the purchasers of such lots access over the
strip of land to the waters of the navigable stream.
It appears, then, that there was no designation whatever on the strip
of land in question; that it was not a part of the public street by which
it lay, nor was itself 'drawn in the form of a street or alley. But the
conclusion of law in connection therewith was that the failure to indicate
that the strip of land had been subdivided for sale amounted to a designation of it for use by the general public. Though not expressly saying
so, the court seems to have determined the question to be: From a reading of the plat as a whole would a purchaser reasonably be led to believe that the areas in dispute were to be left open for use by the public?
And for the question to be answered in the affirmative, it is not necessary, according to this 'decision, that there be an actual marking on the
plat.
The court thus extends the application of a rule, already applied
more strictly against the plattor in this state,1 4 to facts not heretofore
in width, . . .marked 'Meadow Street' ") ; Wheeler v. Consolidated Construction
Co., 170 N. C. 427, 87 S. E. 221 (1915) ("There can be no doubt, from an inspection of the map, that the street . . . is clearly defined as a street on said
map.") ; Green v. Miller, 161 N. C. 24, 76 S.E. 505 (1912) (This issue was submitted to the jury and answered by them in the affirmative: "If this tract or
any part of it was surveyed and platted into lots and street, did any of the streets
so surveyed and platted correspond to what is now known as Pungo Street?");
Collins v. Asheville Land Co., 128 N. C. 563, 39 S. E. 21 (1901) ("certain portions were platted and distinguished as streets, and others as lots."); Conrad v.
West End Hotel & Land Co., 126 N. C. 776, 36 S.E. 282 (1900) ("streets and
public squares, known as Grace Court").

1' As already noted, North Carolina allows the rule to operate where reference
is made only in the negotiations for the sale, and does not require that the plat be
recorded. In addition, in this jurisdiction, the easement may be enforced by all
purchasers under the plat, and it extends to all public ways thereon, even though
remotely located from the lot of the party seeking enforcement. Gaither v.
Albermarle Hospital, Inc., 235 N. C. 431. 70 S. E. 2d 680 (1952); Broocks v.
Muirhead, 223 N. C. 227, 25 S. E. 2d 889 (1943); Home Real Estate Loan &
Ins. Co. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 216 N. C. 778, 7 S. E. 2d 13 (1939) ; Hughes
v. Clark, 134 N. C. 457, 46 S. E. 956 (1904) ; Collins v. Asheville Land Co., 128
N. C. 563, 39 S. E. 21 (1901) ; Conrad v. West End Hotel & Land Co., 126 N. C
776, 36 S. E. 282 (1900).
Some other jurisdictions limit the extent of such easements to the streets and
alleys shown on the plat as are reasonably beneficial to the purchaser, and a
deprivation of which would reduce the value of his lot. Bradley v. Frazier Park
Playgrounds, Inc., 242 P. 2d 958 (Cal. 1952) ; Danielson v. Sykes, 157 Cal. 686,
109 P. 87 (1910); Gerald Park Improvement Assn. v. Bini, 138 Conn. 232, 83
A. 2d 195 (1951); Lake Garda Co. v. D'Arche, 135 Conn. 449, 66 A. 2d
120 (1949) ; Douglas v. Belknap Springs Land Co., 76 N. H. 254, 81 Atl. 1086
(1911) ; Byington v. Bass, 11 Tenn. App. 569 (1930) ; Lindsay v. James, 188 Va.
646. 51 S. E. 326 (1949).
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determined to be within its scope. 15 In doing so, are the principles of
the rule violated? It would seem not. Rather, it would seem to be in
keeping with the principles of the rule to estop a grantor from denying
the use of land, which, because it is unmarked on a plat, taken in conjunction with its peculiar location, would appear to all to have been left
in an open state for the benefit of nearby lot owners. The element of inducement is present and the consequent results in such a case are the
same as in the case where the land is marked affirmatively on the plat.
Further, it is believed that the holding in this case is confined to the
particular facts with which it is concerned, and the decision is not authority for saying that all areas shown on a map as not divided or not
numbered will have an easement imposed upon them. Much stress was
laid on the point that this was a very narrow strip of land, lying between
two public ways, a highway and a navigable stream, and was the only
means of access to the latter. 16
However, on authority of this case, the door is open for courts to be
very liberal in finding inducement by a plattor to support a holding
that an easement exists in his lands in favor of purchasers of lots in a
subdivision. Such practice could lead to abuse in particular instances
if not applied with caution. It is submitted that a court should always
be cautious in holding an adverse interest to exist in lands of an owner
when the case involves a balancing of private rights only.
ARNED

L. HINSHAW

Still other jurisdictions hold that the easement is limited to the adjoining
streets and such other streets as are necessary to give the purchaser access to a

public highway. Mullan v. Hochman, 157 Md. 213, 145 AtI. 554 (1929); Howley

v. Baltimore, 33 Md. 270 (1870) ; Drew v. Wiswall, 183 Mass. 554, 67 N. E. 666
(1903)- Pearson v. Allen, 151 Mass. 79, 23 N. E. 731 (1890).
" In Town of Lumberton v. Branch, 180 N. C. 249, 104 S. E. 460 (1920), our
court refused to find a public dedication of a street where the area in dispute
was not designated as a street on the plat though there was part of a line which
might have been a street boundary, but which was incomplete because of the
frayed edges of the paper.
No instances from other jurisdictions have been found where a private easement was allowed when there was no specific delineation on the plat. The following are cases holding a public dedication to have been made even though the space
in question contained no marking indicating that it was for public uses: Davis
v. Epstein, 77 Ark. 221, 92 S. W. 19 (1905) (finding that grantee intended to dedicate lake shore'where no intervening space was shown on the plat between the lake
and a street parallel to it) ; City and County of San Francisco v. Burr, 4 Cal.
634, 36 P. 771 (1894) (disputed area not named as street, but its boundaries
"clearly indicate that they were intended to represent the lines of a street.");
Coe College v. City of Cedar Rapids, 87 N. W. 444 (Iowa, 1901) (holding that
failure to name as a street a strip marked off like other streets on a plat did
not negative the intention to dedicate").
In these cases, however, an intent to dedicate was shown by the accompanying
circumstances; thus, they are of little help in determining the propriety of allowing a private easement in areas left blank since here the intent o the grantor is
not controlling. See note 3, .supra.
"6See Gaither v. Albermarle Hospital, Inc., 235 N. C. 431, 70 S. E. 2d 680

(1952).
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Descent and Distribution-Advancements
An advancement is a gift by a parent to a child, or to one to whom he
stands in loco parentis, which is intended as an anticipation of the share
which such child would take if the parent were to 'die intestate.' In
North Carolina, if an intestate gives realty or personalty to any of his
children, the value of the property so given Will be deducted from the
child's share upon distribution of the estate in order to equalize the
shares of the children or their descendents.2 If a child refuses to account for his advancements, he shall be considered to have received his
share of the parent's estate and shall not be entitled to receive any fur3
ther part.
In order to constitute an advancement, there must be an actual delivery and change of possession.4
Whether there was an absolute gift, loan, or advancement depends
upon the intention of the grantor at the time of the transaction, taking
into consideration the circumstances surrounding the parties at the
time; and the intention existing at a prior or subsequent date will not
so determine. 5 Thus, a gift absolute when it is made, cannot be conconverted into an advancement by an subsequent statement of a wish to
that effect by the parent, short of a legally executed will.6 The fact that
the donee of a grant regarded it as an advancement will not of itself
determine the character of the transaction.7
Unless there is something in the circumstances tending to raise the
inference of a different purpose, a substantial gift of money or property
from a parent to a child will ordinarily be presumed to be an advancement.8 But money expended for the education and maintenance of a
I King v. Neese, 233 N. C. 132, 63 S. E. 2d 123 (1950) ; Harrelson v. Gooden,
229 N. C. 654, 50 S. E. 2d 901 (1948) ; Lunsford v. Yarborough, 189 N. C. 476, 127
S. E.
426 (1925); Headen v. Headen, 42 N. C. 159 (1850).
2
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1 (2) (1943, recompiled 1950); N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 28-150 (1943, recompiled 1950).
To illustrate: if a parent advanced $1,000 to his son A, $2,000 to his son B,
and nothing to his son C, and then died intestate possessed of an estate of $12,000
with the three sons as his sole heirs, to compute the share of each son, they must
add to the estate left by the decendent the sums which he had given by way of
advancements. This would be $15,000. The share of each son would be $5,000,
and this is the amount to which C is entitled; but as A and B received $1,000 and
$2,000 respectively, their shares will be $4,000 and $3,000.
1 N. C. GmN. STAT. § 28-151 (1943, recompiled 1950); Wolfe v. Galloway,
211 N. C. 361, 190 S.E. 213 (1937).
' Meadows v. Meadows, 33 N. C. 148 (1850).
'Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N. C. 654, 50 S. E. 2d 901 (1948) ; Paschel v.
Paschel, 197 N. C. 40, 147 S. E. 680 (1929); Nobles v. Davenport, 183 N. C.
207, 111 S.E. 180 (1922), See Note 26 A. L. R. 1086 (1923) ; Thompson v. Smith,
160 N. C. 256, 75 S.E. 1010 (1912) ; Kiger v. Terry, 119 N. C. 456, 26 S.E. 38
(1896) ; Bradsher v. Cannady, 76 N. C. 445 (1877) ; James v. James, 76 N. C.
331 (1877).
C Bradsher v. Cannady, 76 N. C. 445 (1877).
Prevette v. Prevette, 203 N. C. 89, 164 S.E. 623 (1932).
8
Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N. C. 654, 50 S. E. 2d 901 (1948); Creech v.
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child is not presumed to be an advancement, because they are the natural
duties which parents are required to perform.0 However, the presumption applies when property given is intended to help the child in a
business or profession,'0 or the settling of a child in life." These presumptions are not conclusive, but are rebuttable by parol evidence. 12
When the parent is indebted to a child and gives the latter property
or money, the presumption is that this is a payment of debt and not an
advancement.' 3 A conveyance for a nominal consideration 14 or the
purchase by a parent who takes title in name of the child 1 are presumed
to be advancements to the child. Parol evidence is competent to rebut
the presumption arising on the face of the deed and show the real intention of the parent.' 6 The presumption of advancement is not affected
by the reservation of a life estate. 17
If an advancement is presumed from the conveyance, the burden of
proof rests upon the party claiming that an advancement was not intended; but when the presumption is that there is no advancement, the
burden of proof shifts to the party claiming an advancement.' 8 Thus
where a deed from a parent to a child recites a consideration near the
value of the property conveyed, the presumption is that the conveyance
was not intended as an advancement, and the burden of proving it to be
an advancement is upon him who alleges it to be such.1
Evidence of the parent's declarations, which are not so close in point
of time to the transaction as to form in fact a part of it and not in the
presence of the child, that a conveyance from the parent to the child
20
was intended as an advancement, or otherwise, is inadmissible.
Since the law of representation always applies to the descent of real
property in North Carolina, grandchildren must always account, in
Creech, 222 N. C. 656, 24 S. E. 2d 642 (1943); Nobles v. Davenport, 183
N. C. 207, 111 S. E. 180 (1922), See Note 26 A. L. R. 1086 (1923);
Thompson v. Smith, 160 N. C. 256, 75 S. E. 1010 (1912); Ex-Parte Griffin, 142
N. C. 116, 54 S. E. 1007 (1906) ; Harper v. Harper, 92 N. C. 300 (1885).
'Kiger v. Terry, 119 N. C. 456, 26 S. E. 38 (1896); Bradsher v. Cannady,
76 N. C. 445 (1877). But also see Wolfe v. Galloway, 211 N. C. 361, 190 S. E.
213 (1937), where the heirs agreed that the referee's finding would be binding,
and the expenses of schooling a grandchild included in his report as advancements
were held as such by the court.
1 Meadows v. Meadows, 33 N. C. 148 (1850).
11
Kiger v. Terry, 119 N. C. 456, 26 S. E. 38 (1896).
12 Thompson v. Smith, 160 N. C. 256, 75 S. E. 1010 (1912).
"Hagler v. McCombs, 66 N. C. 346 (1872).
"'Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N. C. 654, 50 S. E. 2d 901 (1948); Harper v.
Harper,
92 N. C. 300 (1885).
1" Creech v. Creech, 222 N. C. 656, 24 S. E. 2d 642 (1943).
"6Ex-Parte Griffin, 142 N. C. 116, 54 S. E. 1007 (1906).
1 Nobles v. Davenport, 183 N. C. 207, 111 S. E. 180 (1922).
See note 26
A. 18
L. R. 1086 (1923).
Kiger v. Terry, 119 N. C. 456, 26 S. E. 38 (1896).
19
Kiger v. Terry, 119 N. C. 456, 26 S. E. 38 (1896).
2
Hicks v. Forrest, 41 N. C. 528 (1850); Cowan v. Tucker, 30 N. C. 426

(1848).
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dividing land lineally descended, for advancements made to their ancestors.2 1 If personalty is given by an intestate to one of his children,
who died, leaving issue, in the lifetime of the intestate, such grandchildren take per stirpes and will be required to bring the advancements
into hotchpot.2 But if personalty is transferred to children, all of whom
die, leaving issue, during intestate's life time, such grandchildren take
per capita and do not account for advancements made to their respective
parents.2
When an intestate gives property directly to the grandchildren, they do not have to account for the property, regardless of
whether they take per capita or per stirpes.24
North Carolina is contra to the majority of jurisdictions with its rule
that advancements of personal property made by an intestate in his own
life time to his children are to be brought into 'distribution for the benefit
of the widow. 2

5

Where the widow dissents from her husband's will, she

is entitled, in ascertaining her distributive share, to have advancements
of personalty made to legatees (children) under the will estimated as
part of her husband's estate, though as between themselves, there being
but a partial intestacy, such advancements are not subject to be brought
26
into hotchpot.
An agreement by an heir of the intestate that he will take no part in
the distribution of the intestate's estate does not operate as an estoppel
27
against a subsequent assertion of his right.
The doctrine of advancements is based on the idea that parents are
presumed to intend, in the absence of a will, an equality of division
among the children ;28 therefore, in a case of partial intestacy, the doctrine of advancements does not exist. There must be entire intestacy.29 So where a father died intestate as to his real property, but
testate as to his personal property, such of the children who had been
advanced lands before the father's death were not compelled to account
" Crump v. Faucett, 70 N. C. 345 (1874) ; Cromartie v. Kemp, 66 N. C. 38Z
(1872).
"2Parker v. Eason, 213 N. C. 115, 195 S. E. 360 (1938) ; Headen v. Headen,
42 N. C. 159 (1850).
Skinner v. Wynne, 55 N. C. 41 (1854) ; II MoRnEc-A's LAw L -rtrS 1345
(2d ed. 1916).
" Parker v. Eason, 213 N. C. 115, 195 S. E. 360 (1938) ; Headen v. Headen,
42 N. C. 159 (1850). But see Wolfe v. Galloway, footnote 9 supra.
"Eller v. Lillard, 107 N. C. 486, 12 S.E. 462 (1890) ; Headen v. Headen, 42
N. C. 159 (1850) ; Duke v. Duke, 1 N. C. 526 (1801) ; see note 76 A. L. R. 1420
(1932). The question of whether a child advanced more than his total share of
the estate must account to the widow in computing her share has not been decided
by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
"Arrington v. Dortch, 77 N. C. 367 (1877) ; Worth v. McNeil, 57 N. C. 272

(1858).
T

" Melvin v. Bullard, 82 N. C. 34 (1880); Cannon v. Nowell, 51 N. C. 436

(1859).
28
Thompson v. Smith, 160 N. C. 256, 75 S. E. 1010 (1912).

20 Jenkins v. Mitchell, 57 N. C. 207 (1858); Donnell v. Mateer, 40 N. C. 7
(1847); Richmond v. Vanhook, 38 N. C. 581 (1845).
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for them in the -division among all his children of his real estate.8 0 It is
frequently necessary to use parol evidence to construe advancements
or equivalent terms used in the will itself, but extrinsic evidence is not
admissible to contradict terms of the will as to the fact or amounts of
advancements, where such sums are absolutely charged against such
legatees.31 -Thus where there is an express declaration on the part of
the testator that before a daughter is permitted to share in the distribution of his estate she shall account for an advancement, it is not open
to her to show that she received more than the sum or less, or that she
32
received nothing at all.
The amount which should be charged as an advancement is the value
of the property as of the date that it is made, and not as of any subsequent time. 3
If the value of the advancement increases, the
child has the benefit; if it decreases, it falls on the child.3 4 So where the
value of the property advanced to a son was completely diminished, the
son was still charged with the value at the time of delivery. 5
Even if value of some sort is paid by the grantee, a conveyance may
30
be an advancement as to its value in excess of such consideration.
Where a father conveyed to his son a tract of land worth $1,200 for
which the son paid $400, the $800 excess of value over the price paid was
37
charged as an advancement.
No interest should be charged against an advancement on accounting,
provided the accounting is had within two years allowed by law for the
38
settlement of the estate.
The personalty of the estate is made the primary fund for the equalization of advancements of personalty, and the realty is made the primary
fund for the equalization of advancements of realty, and it is only when
and to the extent that there is an excessive advancement in either category of property over and above the share which may come to the other
beneficiaries that such excess may be considered in the distribution of the
other category.3 9 So where an advancement in real estate to a son was
3 Jenkins v. Mitchell, 57 N. C. 207 (1858).
"1Dodson v. Fulk, 147 N. C. 530, 61 S. E. 196 (1908).
Dodson v. Fulk, 147 N. C. 530, 61 S. E. 196 (1908).
" Langsford v. Yarborough, 189 N. C. 476, 127 S. E. 426 (1925) ; Tart v. Tart,
154 N. C. 502, 70 S. E. 929 (1911); Ward v. Riddick, 57 N. C. 22 (1858) ; Raiford
v. Raiford, 41 N. C. 490 (1849); Meadows v. Meadows, 33 N. C. 148 (1850);
Lamb v. Carroll, 28 N. C. 4 (1845).
8" Banks v. Shannonhouse, 61 N. C. 284 (1867) ; Walton v. Walton, 42 N. C.
138 (1850) ; Hicks v. Forrest, 41 N. C. 528 (1850).
3

'Banks v. Shannonhouse, 61 N. C. 284 (1867); Walton v. Walton. 42 N. C.
138 (1850) ; Hicks v. Forrest, 41 N. C. 528 (1850).
6 Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N. C. 654, 50 S. E. 2d 901 (1948); Barbee v.
Barbee, 109 N. C. 299, 13 S. E. 792 (1891).
" Barbee v. Barbee, 109 N. C. 229. 13 S. E. 792 (1891).
" Lansford v. Yarborough, 189 N. C. 476, 127 S. E. 426 (1925) ; Tart v. Tart,

154 3N. C. 502, 70 S. E. 929 (1911) ; Hanner v. Winburn, 42 N. C. 142 (1850).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1 (2) (1943, recompiled 1950); N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 28-150 (1943, recompiled 1950); King v. Neese, 233 N. C. 132, 63 S. E. 2d
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of greater value than an equal share descending to the other children,
the one so advanced was charged in the distribution of the personal
40
estate of the parent with the excess in value over an equal share.
The Legislature has passed statutes which permit the clerk of the
Superior Court to advance portions of a nonsane person's estate to cer41
tain of the latter's relatives, which must be accounted for at death.
WMv.

WHITFIELD SMITH

Federal jurisdiction-Diversity of Citizenship-Multiple
Corporations
Plaintiff, a citizen of Massachusetts, brought a personal injury action
in the federal district court for Massachusetts against defendant railroad
corporation, alleging it to be incorporated under the laws of New York.
Defendant was in fact a multiple corporation existing under the laws of
New York, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. The court of appeals,
in affirming the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction, held that
for purposes of federal jurisdiction a multiple corporation must be regarded in each state of its incorporation as solely domesticated therein,
and that there is no diversity of citizenship jurisdiction where such corporation is sued in one of the states of its incorporation by a citizen of
that same state.1
The district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $3000 and is between citizens of different states. 2 When the Supreme
Court first considered the status of corporations in connection with the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, it held that a corporation was not a
citizen and that the citizenship of the stockholders would control.3 The
Court later adopted the fiction that there is a conclusive presumption
that all the stockholders of a corporation are citizens of the state of incorporation. 4 Under this fiction, 5 a corporation created under the laws
123 (1950). No North Carolina case has passed on the question of recovery from
an heir of an excess of advancements over his whole distributive share in the estate.
But cases outside of North Carolina are in accord in ruling that the heir cannot be
required to refund the excess, but can only be excluded from participating in the
division of the estate. See note, 46 A. L. R. 1428 (1927).
40 Harrelson v. Gooden, 229 N. C. 654, 50 S. E. 2d 901 (1948).
"N. C. GFN. STAT. § 35-19 through § 35-29 (1943, recompiled 1950) ; Patrick
v. Trust Co., 216 N. C. 525, 5 S. E. 2d 724 (1939).
Seavey v. Boston & Maine . R, 197 F. 2d 485 (1st Cir. 1952).
-62 STAT. 930 (1948), 28 U. S. C. A. § 1332 (1949).
'Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61 (U. S. 1809).
'This doctrine was first announced in Louisville, C. & C. R. R. v. Letson, 2
How. 497 (U. S. 1844). It is forcefully stated in Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S.
444, 445 (1876), as follows: "For the purposes of jurisdictioif it is conclusively
presumed that all stockholders are citizens of the state which by its laws created
the corporation."
'The fiction has been severely criticized as judicial usurpation. McGovney,
A Supreme Court Fiction, 56 HARv. L. Rxv. 853, 1090, 1225 (1943).
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of one state is, for jurisdictional purposes, deemed a citizen of that state.
Where, however, a corporation is actually incorporated in two or more
states,8 there is a separate corporation in each such state despite the
identity of officers, directors, and stockholders, 7 and difficult problems of
federal jurisdiction arise. Multiple incorporation should not be confused, however, with the mere licensing of a foreign corporation or the
conferment of certain powers upon it by a second state.8 Under such
circumstances; the corporation remains a citizen of the state of "original"
incorporation, since, for purposes of federal jurisdiction, no new corporation is created in the licensing state.9
The problem to be considered here is: Where a multiple corporation
incorporated in States A and B is suing or being sued in one of these
states by a citizen of one of these same states,'0 what citizenship is to be
attributed to the multiple corporation, that of State A or of State B?
This determination is a necessary factor in deciding (1) whether or not
there is diversity of citizenship between the parties in a suit originally
instituted in a federal court, and (2) whether or not a multiple corporation which is defendant in a suit commenced in a state court may remove
the suit to federal court on the ground of diverse citizenship. This latter
question is complicated by the existence of a federal statute" which
grants the right of removal on the ground of diversity of citizenship
only if none of the -defendants is a citizen of the state in which suit is
8 Railroad corporations are almost the only companies which employ multiple
incorporation. The reasons for the use of the device and the extent of its use

in this field are discussed in Multiple Incorporation as a Form of Railroad Organization, 46 YALE L. J. 1370, 1371-76, 1382 (1937).

S". .. it is evident that by the general law railroad corporations created by
two or more States, though joined in their interests, in the operation of their
roads, in the issue of their stock, and in the division of their profits, so as practically to be a single corporation, do not lose their identity; and that each one has
its existence and its standing in the courts of the country, only by virtue of the
legislation of the State by which it is created. The union of name, of officers, of
business and of property does not change their distinctive character as separate
corporations." Nashua & Lowell Ry. v. Boston & Lowell Ry., 136 U. S. 356, 382
(1890).
' For a discussion of the problem of distinguishing between actual multiple
incorporation and the mere recognition of or conferment of powers on the existing
corporation (commonly called "domestication"), see DoME, FEDERAL PROcEDURE
§ 65 (1928); Patch v. Wabash R. R., 207 U. S. 277 (1907); Southern Ry. v.
Allison. 190 U. S.326 (1903) ; St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. James, 161 U. S. 545
(1896) ; Pennsylvania R. R. v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. R., 118 U. S. 290 (1886);
Memphis & C. Ry. v. Alabama, 107 U. S.581 (1882).
' In Southern Ry. v. Allison, 190 U. S.326, 337 (1903) it is stated, "so it seems
that a corporation may be made what is termed a domestic corporation, or in
form a domestic corporation of a State in compliance with the legislation thereof,
by filing a copy of its charter and by-laws with the Secretary of State, yet such
fact does not affect the character of the original corporation. It does not thereby
become a citizen of the State in which a copy of its charter is filed, so far as to
affect the jurisdiction of the Federal courts upon a question of diverse citizenship."
10 The peculiar problems considered in this note arise only under the fact situation outlined above.
11 62 STAT. 937 (1948), 28 U. S. C. A. § 1441 (1950).
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brought. Apparently, however, this non-citizen requirement may be
waived. 12
Several Supreme Court cases have laid down the rule that where a
multiple corporation is defendant in an action brought by a citizen of one
of its states of incorporation such corporation is considered to be a
citizen of the state where suit is brought when it is incorporated in that
state.' 3 So, where suit is originally commenced in federal court in
State B by a citizen of State B against a multiple corporation incorporated in State A and B, it citizenship under this rule is that of State
B, and no diversity is present. The opposite result would follow if a
suit involving the same parties had been commenced in federal court in
State A. It would seem that under this rule, the defendant multiple
corporation should never have removal on the ground of diversity (unless there is a waiver by plaintiff of the non-citizen requirement) of a
suit commenced in state court in any of the states in which the corporation is incorporated. This conclusion follows from the fact that the
corporation will always be a citizen of the state of suit ;14 and, as pointed
out above, there may be no diversity of citizenship in the first place. 15
Five of the six circuits that have reviewed the problem have approved
this "state of suit" rule.'6 One of these, the fourth circuit, applied the
12 Monroe v. United Carbon Co., 196 F. 2d 455 (5th Cir. 1952), relying on
Baggs v. Martin, 179 U. S. 206 (1900), holds that there is a waiver of the noncitizen requirement for removal [28 U. S. C. A. § 1441 (b)] if the plaintiff in the
suit fails to make a motion to remand the case, and that the federal court to which
it is removed may then treat the action as one originally brought in federal court.
" Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S.444 (1876), and Chicago & N. W. R. R. v. Whitton,
13 Wall. 270 (U. S. 1871), used this rule in determining the citizenship of the
corporations there involved. Patch v. Wabash R. R., 207 U. S.277, 283 (1907),
seems to have relied at least in part on this principle: "It [defendant multiple
corporation] is alleged to have incurred a liability under the laws of the same
state, and is sued in that state. It cannot escape the jurisdiction by the fact that
it is incorporated elsewhere."
"' Although no case was found which clearly denied removal to a multiple
corporation because of the non-citizen requirement of the removal statute, it is
probable that Patch v. Wabash R. R., 207 U. S. 277 (1907) reached this result.
It would certainly seem that if a corporation is considered a citizen of the state
of suit for diversity purposes, it will also be considered a citizen of that same state
for purposes of removal and hence barred from removing in the above situation.
But cf. Lucas v. NeNv York Central R. R., 88 F. Supp. 536 (S. D. N. Y. 1950),
which did not concern removal as such, but in which the court incidentally mentioned that removal had been allowed from a state court to it in a situation where,
for diversity purposes, the multiple corporation was considered a citizen of the
state of suit. Perhaps the removal may be explained by waiver or even mistake.
1" See e.g., Memphis & Charleston Ry. v. Alabama, 107 U. S.581 (1883) ; Case
v. Atlantic & C. A. L. Ry., 225 Fed. 862 (W. D. S. C. 1915).
" Starke v. New York, C. & S. L. R. R., 180 F. 2d 569 (7th Cir. 1950);
Town of Bethel v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 81 F. 2d 60 (4th Cir. 1936) ; Peterborough R. R. v. Boston & M. R. R., 239 Fed. 97 (1st Cir. 1917) ; Lake Shore &
M. S. Ry. v. Eder, 174 Fed. 944 (6th Cir. 1909) ; Missouri Pacific 1y. v. Meeh,
69 Fed. 753 (8th Cir. 1895).
For other cases approving this rule, see Murphy v. Hudson & M. R. R., 45 F.
Supp. 720 (E. D. N. Y. 1942); Muller v. Boston & M. R. R., 9 F. Supp. 802
(D. N. H. 1935); Goodwin v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 124 Fed. 358 (D.
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rule to the situation where the multiple corporation was plaintiff, and
7

the Supreme Court denied certiorari.1
One Supreme Court case seemingly announced a second rule applicable when the multiple corporation is plaintiff in an action. Although
the case has been differently interpreted,18 it seems to hold that a multiple corporation in a suit against a citizen of one of its states of incorporation may assume the citizenship of any of its charter states by
alleging in its complaint the character in which it is suing.'0 A recent
decision from the third circuit held that where a multiple corporation

is defendant in this type of suit, the plaintiff may, by allegation in the
complaint, fix the citizenship of the defendant as that of any chosen
state of incorporation?2 "The latter decision seems to be an outcry
against the formality of the "state of suit" rule, which requires the
plaintiff in a suit against a multiple corporation to go into a foreign
state in order to maintain the suit in federal court. 2' Assuming there is
diversity, it would seem that under this rule removal should be allowed

to the defendant multiple corporation (so far as the statutory noncitizen requirement is concerned) if the suit is brought in a state different from one in which citizenship is given defendant corporation by allegation of the plaintiff.22 Conversely, unless there is a waiver by plainMass. 1903); Baldwin v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 86 Fed. 167 (W. D. Mich. 1898);
Paul v. Baltimore & 0. & C. R. R., 44 Fed. 513 (C. C. D. Ind. 1890); Stout v.
Sioux City & Pac. R. R., 8 Fed. 794 (C. C. D. Neb. 1881).
11 Town of Bethel v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 81 F. 2d 60 (4th Cir. 1936),
cert. denied, 298 U. S.682 (1936).
's Town of Bethel v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 81 F. 2d 60 (4th Cir. 1936)
interpreted the Nashua case as holding that a plaintiff multiple corporation may
fix its citizenship for purposes of federal jurisdiction by its allegation as to which
entity is suing. This is believed to be the correct interpretation. In Missouri
Pacific Ry. v. Meeh, 69 Fed. 753 (8th Cir. 1895), the court took the view that the
case involved a suit by one entity (incorporated in New Hampshire) of the multiple
corporation against the other entity (incorporated in Massachusetts), and that the
decision is distinguishable on that ground. Goodwin v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
R., 124 Fed. 358 (C. C. D. Mass. 1903) disapproved the Missouri Pacific case and
stated that the Nashta case did not even involve a multiple corporation, but
rather a single corporation whose citizenship was diverse from the defendant's
citizenship.
" Nashua & Lowell Ry. v. Boston & Lowell Ry., 136 U. S.356 (1890).
20 Gavin v. Hudson & Manhattan R. R., 185 F. 2d 104 (3d Cir. 1950). Commented on in Notes, 3 ALA. L. REv. 397 (1951), 4 BAYLoR L. Rav. 227 (1952),
20 FoRD. L. REv. 203 (1951), 64 HARV. L. Ray. 1009 (1951).
2 "Defendant [multiple corporation] says that these plaintiffs from New Jersey

could sue the New York defendant corporation in New York or that a New Yorker
could come over to New Jersey and sue the defendant as a New Jersey corpora-

tion. But, says defendant, it cannot be sued in a federal court in New York by a
New Yorker or in New Jersey by a New Jerseyite. Such a rule if adopted may

be an effective means of promoting additional passenger business for the Hudson
& Manhattan [defendant railroad], but we think it would be pretty hard to explain
its reasons to a layman." Gavin v. Hudson & Manhattan R. R., 185 F. 2d 104, 105

(3d Cir. 1950).
22 If the multiple corporation is to be regarded as a citizen of a particular
state under the "allegation" rule for purposes of the diversity issue, it seems that
logical consistency would require the same citizenship (and that one alone) to be

1953]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

tiff, it would seem that removal is not possible if the citizenship alleged
is that of the state in which suit is brought.
Other cases have at least mentioned, and perhaps relied upon, a third
possible rule applicable when the multiple corporation is defendant,
This rule is that the multiple corporation is considered a citizen of the
state in which the cause of action arose when it is incorporated in that
state. It can be inferred from these cases that the courts felt that the
particular entity of the multiple corporation incorporated in the state
where the cause of action arises is responsible therefor and is the proper
defendant in the action. Considerable doubt as to whether this is a valid
rule stems from the fact that none of these cases were decided solely on
this factor, since in each case the suit was brought in the state of incorporation where the cause of action arose. 24 In addition, quite a few
25
cases have expressly repudiated the rule.
As has probably been noted, the law dealing with the citizenship of
multiple corporations is very uncertain. Although two Supreme Court
cases applied the "state of suit" rule when the multiple corporation was
used in determining the removal issue. Thus, in the above hypothetical situation,
the fact that the corporation is incorporated in the state of suit should not bar removal; instead, the corporation should be considered a citizen of the alleged state
of incorporation (different from the state of suit), and hence removal should be
allowed to it as a non-citizen of the state of suit.
In Memphis & Charleston Ry. v. Alabama, 107 U. S. 581, 585 (1883), it is
stated: "The defendant, being a corporation of the State of Alabama, has no
existence in this State as a legal entity or person, except under and by force of its
incorporation by this State; and, although also incorporatetd in the State of
Tennessee, must, as to all its doings within the State of Alabama, be considered a
citizen of Alabama . . ." [italics added].

In Patch v. Wabash R. R., 207 U. S.

277, 283 (1907), the following language was used: "It [defendant corporation]
is alleged to have incurred a liability under the laws of . . . [Illinois], and is
sued in that state. It cannot escape the jurisdiction by the fact that it is incorporated elsewhere." [italics added]. This latter case seems to combine both the
"state of suit" theory and the "state of cause of action" theory in its decision.
See also Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Meeh, 69 Fed. 753 (8th Cir. 1895); Winn v.
Wabash R. R., 118 Fed. 55 (W. D. Mo. 1902).
"' These decisions fail to express any view whatsoever on the situation where
the cause of action arises in one state of incorporation and the suit is brought in
another state.
"' See Smith v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 96 Fed. 504 (C. C. D. Mass.
1899), where it was held that the entities of a multiple corporation are jointly
liable for a tort arising from any operation of the multiple corporation, wherever
committed. In Gavin v. Hudson & Manhattan R. R., 185 F. 2d 104, 106 (3d Cir.
1950), the court stated: "We think it does not matter in determining the place
where the plaintiff may sue whether he was hurt by the defendant [multiple corporation] in New York or New Jersey. It is perfectly obvious that there is only
one operating group and its employees work just as fully for one corporation as the
other. It is little short of absurd to say that the New York corporation commits
the New York torts, if any, and the New Jersey corporation the torts in New
Jersey, if any." See also Seavey v. Boston & Maine R. R., 197 F. 2d 485 (1st
Cir. 1952) (instant case) ; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Eder, 174 Fed. 944 (6th
Cir. 1909) ; Murphey v. Hudson & Manhattan R. R, 45 F. Supp. 720 (E. D. N. Y.
1942) ; Muller v. Boston and M. R. R., 9 F. Supp. 802 (D. N. H. 1935) ; Case
v. Atlantic & C. A. L. Ry., 225 Fed. 862 (W. D. S. C. 1915) ; Horne v. Boston
& M. R. R., 18 Fed. 50 (D. N. H. 1883).
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defendant, 26 the last Supreme Court consideration of this problem, Patch
v. Wabash R. R.,2 7 interjected uncertainty into the law. In holding the
defendant multiple corporation to be a citizen of Illinois, the Court
placed its decision on the dual factors that the cause of action arose in
Illinois and that the suit was brought in that same state. In the situation where the multiple corporation is plaintiff, definitive Supreme Court
authority is lacking, even though, as pointed out above, there is one case
which apparently held the "allegation" rule proper in that situation.28
Although several distinctions exist between the two rules which may
differently affect the rights of the parties or the numbers of cases of this
peculiar kind which will get into federal courts,29 the preferability of
one rule over the other does not seem to be the most pressing problem
in this area of confused law. What is most needed is a clear set of rules
from the Supreme Court so that party litigants may advisedly chart the
course of the suit.
WALKER Y. WORTH, JR.

Negligence-FELA-Proximate Cause-Function of Jury
When an airhose on defendant's train burst, locking the brakes and
stopping the train, plaintiff brakeman attempted to make repairs, He
tapped on the coupling of the airhose with a wrench, knocking loose
particles of dust and rust, some of which lodged in his left eye, causing
loss of vision. Suit was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act' and the Federal Safety Appliance Act.2 The jury found
2

See n. 13 supra.

27207 U. S. 277 (1907).
28

See n. 19 supra.

The differences noted are the following:
(1) The inability of the defendant multiple corporation to remove from a state
court under the "state of suit" rule, absent any waiver by the plaintiff, as con28

trasted with the possibility of removal under the "allegation" rule in the particular
situation where the citizenship given the multiple corporation by allegation of the
plaintiff is different from the state of suit. It should be noted that this limitation
is in no way harsh, since, under the assumed fact situation, the suit will always
be in one of the states of incorporation of the defendant multiple corporation, and
any claim of local prejudice would be without merit.
(2) The ritual of the "state of suit" rule which requires the plaintiff (who is
a citizen of one of the states of incorporation of defendant multiple corporation)
in a suit against a multiple corporation to go into a foreign state in order to
maintain the suit in federal court on the ground of diversity of citizenship. This
limitation and the former one illustrate the fact that the "state of suit" rule is
less liberal than the "allegation" rule in allowing access to the federal courts in
suits of this kind.
(3) The limitation of the "state of suit" rule which prevents the transfer of a
suit from a federal court in one state of incorporation of the multiple corporation
where there is diversity of citizenship to another charter state of which the adverse party is a citizen. The transfer is improper since it would cause diversity
to cease and hence oust the jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Lucas v. New
York Central R. R., 88 F. Supp. 536 (S. D. N. Y. 1950).
1 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended; 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq. (1946), which provides
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that the plaintiff's injury was the proximate result of (1) defendant's
negligence in allowing rust and dust to accumulate on the airhose and
(2) defendant's violation of the Safety Appliance Act in having defective
air brakes. The Supreme Court of Texas, in a four to three decision,
affirmed jury findings.3
This case presents three interesting problems in a highly specialized
field of tort law. These are: (1) What constitutes negligence in cases
under FELA? (2) Assuming that there is negligence or a violation
of the Safety Appliance Act, when is an injury proximately caused by
such negligence or violation? (3) What part does the jury play in
answering these questions?
The orthodox conception of negligence in employer-employee relationships is that an employer is negligent when he fails to use reasonable care and prudence in providing for the safety of employees. 4 Under
recent Supreme Court rulings, almost any act or ommission by an agent
of a railroad which precedes injury to an employee might be declared
to be negligence, 5 or the mere occurrence of an accident might be the
basis for liability.0 For example, where plaintiff's intestate, unloadthat "Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between
any of the several states . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury.. . resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency,
due to its negligence, in its cars, engine, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed,
works, boats, wharves, or other equipment." See Richter and Forer, Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 12 F. R. D. 13 (1951) ; Note, 22 So. CALIF. L. REv. 63

(1948).

127 STAT. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 1-16 (1946). The Act imposes a duty on railroads engaged in interstate commerce to provide certain safety
appliances and creates absolute liability for injuries which are proximately caused
by the absence of these appliances or any defect in them. Application of the Act
is explained in Note, 16 A. L. R. 2d 654 and in 3 NACCA L. J. 200 (1949). The
Safety Appliance Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, note 1 supra,
are in pari materia, and the former is treated as an amendment to the latter. The
Safety Appliance Act merely dispenses with the necessity of showing that a violation of the appliance statute is negligence and makes such violation negligence as a
matter of law. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163 (1949).
'Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. v. Evans, 250 S. W. 2d 385 (Tex. 1952) (case
reversed and remanded to consider new evidence of discovery of cancer in plaintiff's eye).
' Patton v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 179 U. S. 658, 662 (1901), where the Court
said, "The fact of accident carries with it no presumption of negligence on the
part of the employer; and it is an affirmative fact for the injured employee to
establish that the employer has been guilty of negligence." The Court went on to
state that the employer must use reasonable care and prudence in providing for employees and that, beyond such reasonable provision, the employer owes no duty.
'Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U. S. 459 (1947) (assigning female plaintiff to night
duty as telegraph operator, where she was criminally attacked) ; Ellis v. Union
Pacific R. R., 329 U. S. 649 (1947) (not giving plaintiff oral warning of an impaired clearance already marked by a sign) ; Seago v. New York Central R. R.,
315 U. S. 781 (1942) (engineer's moving train as usual without ascertaining a
crewman's location); Owens v. Union Pacific R. R, 319 U. S. 715 (1942)
(similar facts).
'Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53 (1949) (railroad had grease-pit surrounded by guard chains; plaintiff went around barriers and accidentally fell into
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ing ashes from a hopper car on a bridge, lost his footing on the twelveinch ledge, fell and was fatally injured, the Supreme Court approved
a jury verdict based on negligence in failing to provide deceased with
a safe place to work.7 In another case, the Court held that a jury
might properly "infer" negligence and find that the railroad had failed
to furnish a brakeman with a "safe place to work" where he stepped on
a coal clinker lying in the railway yard, fell and was injured.8 The
Texas court follows this trend of holding railroads to an economically
impractical, if not impossible, standard of care, by imposing on the defendant railroad the duty to keep exposed parts of the train absolutely
,
free of "particles foreign to a human eye."
In -determining when a violation of duty is the proximate cause of
an injury,10 the best test, appears to be the "substantial factor" test,11
or the "appreciable factor" test 12 as it is sometimes stated, but in FELA
cases the test now used seems to be the very liberal "but for" or sine qua
non test.' 3 It cannot be denied that the wording of the statute partially
pit) ; Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. R., 329 U. S. 452 (1946) (cars jumped
track which was apparently in proper order and switchman was killed) ; Lavender
v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645 (1946) (switchman found dead near tracks from blow on
head). But see Prosser, Law of Torts § 49, p. 358 (1941) ("Railway .,..not
liable for . . . arcident unless its negligence has increased the danger .

.

0").

In

industry generally, employee assumes risk of such incidents of the employment
against which he can protect himself equally as well as the master. Id. § 67.
7 Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 119' U. S. 350 (1943) ; cf. Tiller v. Atlantic C. L,
R. R., 318 U. S. 54 (1943) (clearance of three feet and seven inches between tracks
could be found by jury to be an unsafe place to work). The Court makes no
suggestion as to what is a safe place to work. Contra: Toledo, St. L. & W. Ry.
v. Allen, 276 U. S.165 (1928) (Supreme Court held that two feet and nine inches
clearance between trains was not an unsafe place to work).
'Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U. S. 294 (1949), reversing 77 Ga. App. 780,
49 S.E. 2d 833 (1948). The Georgia court found no negligence as a matter of
law. See a later Georgia case: Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Chapman, 84 Ga. App.
94, 65 S. E. 2d 629 (1951) (defendant railroad guilty of negligence in allowing
clinkers to lie in yard). Contra: Gulf, M. & N. R. R. v. Wells, 275 U. S.455
(1928), reversing and remanding 107 So. 27 (Miss. 1926) (where jury had found
for a brakeman who alleged that an unusual jerk of a train which he was boarding
and a coal clinker underfoot combined to cause him to fall and be injured) ; Frizell
v. Wabash R. R., 199 F. 2d 153 (8th Cir. 1952) (railroad not negligent where
plaintiff slipged on cinders alongside track).
'Missoun-Kansas-Texas R. P. v. Evans, 250 S.W. 2d 385, 393 (Tex. 1952)
(three dissenting judges argued that there was no negligence as a matter of law,
that to hold otherwise would be to burden railroads with an "unreasonable and
impossible" standard of conduct). The standard suggested would require railroad
companies to incessantly wash freight cars and then chip off the rust that the
moisture caused.
" Atchison. T. & S. F. Ry. v. Toops. 281 U. S. 351 (1930) (plaintiff must
establish a causal relation between carrier's violation of some duty owed and his
injury to impose liability on employer); Lang v. New York Central R. R., 255
U. S.455 (1921) ; St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. Conarty, 238 U. S.243 (1914).
" Mitchell v. Friedman, 11 N. J. Super. 344, 78 A. 2d 417 (1951). See

PROSSFR, LAW OF TORTS § 46 (1941); RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 431 (1934) (Was
actor's wrong a substantial cause in bringing about the injury? One must use
care to distinguish the legal from the philosophic cause).
" PROssmu, LAW OF TORTS § 46 (1941).
" Heiting v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 352 Ill. 466, 96 N. E. 842 (1911);
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justifies the use of such a test. 14 Thus, "... so long as the negligence
of the carrier partly contributes to cause the injury or death of an
employee, then the carrier is responsible for the full amount of that injury and death."'1 It seems clear from recent Supreme Court rulings
that liability of a railroad for injuries or death to employees may be
predicated on any obscure or remote connection between the defendant's
carelessness and the plaintiff's injury.1 For example, the Court held
that a railroad might be found to be negligent in assigning female
plaintiff to night duty as telegraph operator and that this proximately
caused her injury when she unlocked the door and admitted a strange
man, who criminally attacked her.'1 In another case, the Court said
that the failure of couplers to connect automatically on the first attempt
could be found to have been the proximate cause of injuries to a crewman who climbed aboard the car, stopped it from rolling, signalled the
engineer to make a second attempt, and was thrown to the floor of the
car and injured by the force of the impact when the coupling was
effected on the second try.'8 Another opinion declared that where a
signalman was riding on a motorcar several hundred feet behind a
train, which stopped suddenly due to the defective brakes "setting," and
he crashed into the rear of the train, the unsafe brakes could be found
to be the proximate cause of his death even though the deceased would
have had ample time to stop his car, had he been looking ahead. 10
Camp v. Wilson, 258 Mich. 38, 241 N. W. 844 (1932) ; HARPER, LAW oF TORTS
§ 100 (1933) (if consequences would not have occurred but for defendant's conduct, his acts are causal in fact).
1435 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C., § 51 (1946) ("railroad ...
liable .

.

. for such injury .

.

. resulting in whole or in part from the negligence

of.. . carrier"); Spokane & I. E. R. R. v. Campbell, 241 U. S. 497 (1916). The
Supreme Court seems to interpret "in whole or in part" as allowing liability where
the violation of duty is merely a contributing cause in a philosophic sense, but it is
submitted that the phrase should be construed as requiring that such negligence be a substantial, contributory cause in a legal sense. See note 11, supra.
1 Dooley, The Meaning of FELA to the Railroad Worker, OKLA. B. A. J.

67, 68 (1951).

"Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry., 321 U. S. 29 (1944), reversing 134 F. 2d
860 (7th Cir. 1943) (failure of engineer to ring bell and unexplained death of
switchman who was run over). This case was unwillingly followed and
severely criticized in Griswold v. Gardner, 155 F. 2d 333 (7th Cir. 1946);
Tiller v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 318 U. S. 54 (1943), reversing 128 F. 2d
420 (4th Cir. 1942) ; after retrial and on second appeal, 323 U. S. 574 (1945),
reversing 142 F. 2d 718 (4th Cir. 1944) (insufficient light on backing freight train
and death of night policeman by being run over in unexplained accident). Contra:
Pennsylvania R. R. v. Chamberlain, 288 U. S. 333 (1933), reversing 59 F. 2d
986 (2d Cir. 1932); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Toops, 281 U. S. 351 (1930).
17 Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U. S. 459 (1947), reversing 162 F. 2d 716 (1947).
IS Carter v. Atlanta & St. A. B. Ry., 338 U. S. 430 (1949), reversing 170 F. 2d
719 (1948).
1 Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U. S. 520 (1948), reversing 112 Utah 166,
185 P. 2d 963 (1947). State court argued that violation of Safety Appliance Act
in having defective air brakes was not the legal cause of the death, but it merely
created a condition after which intestate, by his own negligence, caused his own
death. See PROSsER, LAW OF TORTS, § 45 (1941); Beale, The Proximate Con-
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The majority of the Texas court followed the Supreme Court's attitude in holding that plaintiff's eye injury was proximately caused by
defendant's violation of a statute requiring trains to have effective power
brakes20° The three dissenting judges argued that "As a matter of law
the bursting of the airhose was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injuries." 21 They asserted that the "force" of the violation of the Safety
Appliance Act came to rest when the train stopped, that the violation
merely created a set of circumstances or conditions from which the
injury to the plaintiff occurred, 22 and that it was a "remote" cause of
23

plaintiff's injuries.
Generally, a personal injury case will not go to the jury unless
there is sufficient evidence of facts from which it might reasonably be
found that the defendant was guilty of a breach of duty proximately
causing the injury to the plaintiff.24 In the past ten years, with only
sequences of an; Act, 33 HARv. L. RV. 633, 651 (1920).
"Causal relationship between negligence or violation of a Safety Appliance
regulation, and injury, has been markedly reduced as a hurdle and has been uniformly held to be a question of fact for the jury.' Richter and Forer, Federal
Employers Liability Act-A Real Compensatory Law for Railroad Workers, 36
CoRNELL L. Q. 203, 231 (1951).
2 "Injuries received by railroad employees in repairing the brake system are
within the protection of the Act." (italics added). Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R.
v. Evans, 250 S. W. 2d 385, 388 (Texas 1952) ; cf. Minneapolis, St. P., & S. S. M.
Ry. v. Goneau, 269 U. S. 406 (1926). In this case, the principal decision relied
on by the Texas court, a brakeman lost his balance, fell from a bridge, and was
seriously injured while trying to effect a coupling between cars with a defective
coupler. Contra: Bohm v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 161 Minn. 74, 200 N. W.
804 (1924), cert. denied, 267 U. S. 600 (1925) (brakeman going to inspect a defect in air brakes fell off bridge); Reetz v. Chicago & E. R. R., 46 F. 2d 50
(6th Cir. 1931) (similar facts) ; McCalmont v. Pennsylvania R. R., 283 Fed. 736
(6th Cir. 1922).
"' Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R. v. Evans, 250 S. W. 2d 385, 393 (Texas 1952)
See Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARv. L. REv. 633, 640
(1920). "The rule that requires exclusion of remote consequences is ... a fundamental principle of law, based on the necessity of doing justice to all, and
the question in any particular case, whether a given result is remote, is purely
a question of law." (italics added).
"The position of the dissent resembles that of the court in Coray v. Southern
Pacific Co., 112 Utah 166, 185 P. 2d 963 (1947), reversed in 335 U. S. 520 (1948) ;
accord, Lang v. New York C. M. R., 255 U. S. 455 (1921) (absence of an automatic coupler required by statute was not proximate cause of intestate's death
but merely a condition which made it possible for intestate to be crushed between
two cars without couplers, although he would not have been injured had the cars
had couplers) ; St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. Conarty, 238 U. S. 243 (1914) (similar
facts and holding) ; Phillips v. Pennsylvania R. R., 283 Fed. 381 (1922).
23 "We are of the opinion that an injury sustained While repairing a piece of
machinery is not proximately caused by the ,defect in the machinery making
necessary the repairs. Such a defect is in law a remote cause." Missouri-KansasTexas R. R. v. Evans, 250 S. W. 2d 385, 394 (Texas 1952) ; accord, Schoultz
v. Eckardt Mfg. Co., 112 La. 658, 36 So. 593 (1904) (employee injured by his own
negligence while repairing a machine belt was not injured by the breaking of the
belt). See HARPER, LAW OF TORTS § 110 (1933) (where violation of duty is a
cause in fact in a philosophical sense, it is not necessarily a legal or culpable
cause) ; See also note 11 supra.
"Texas & N. 0. R. R. v. Warden, 78 S. W. 2d 164 (Tex. 1935) ; Austin v.
Southern Ry., 197 N. C. 319, 148 S. E. 446 (1929); Gulf, M. & N. R. R. v. Wells,
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rare exceptions, the Supreme Court has been adamant in its insistence
that FELA cases should go to the jury, even where circuit and state
supreme courts had held that the evidence was insufficient as a matter
of law. 20 For instance, where a switch tender was found lying beside
a track after a train had passed, fatally injured from a blow on the
head, and plaintiff argued that the deceased had probably been struck
by a mail hook which could have swung out twelve inches from the
passing train and dealt the fatal blow, the Court held that a jury might
be justified in so finding from the "probative facts" present, although
the only conclusive evidence was that the deceased had been found dying
27
from a blow on the head, on a dark night in an outlying railway yard.
275 U. S. 455 (1928), reversing 107 So. 27 (Miss. 1926); Bohm v. Chicago, M.

& St. P. Ry., 161 Minn. 74, 200 N. W. 804 (1924), cert. denied, 267 U. S. 600
(1925). See also PRossER, LAw OF TORTS § 50 (1941) (questions of fact regard-

ing negligence and proximate cause are for jury, but standard of care and legal
limits
on proximate
questions
law to beassettled
by the
court);
WM~oR,
EVIDENCEcause
§ 2552doctrine
(3d ed.are
1940)
(judgeofdeclares,
a matter
of law,
the
outside limits wvithin which jury serves as finders of' fact) ; James, Functions of
Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YAXE L. Joux. 667 (1949). N. C. 367, 23
222 Douglas, and
arming
(1943),Black,
U. S.
Ry., 320
S. E.Brady
2d 334
Southern(strong
v. (1942)
dissent
by476
Justices
Murphy,
Rutledge expressing view that the jury verdict should be sustained); Reynolds
v. Atlantic C. L.
R, 336 U. S.e
207 (1949), afirmg 251 Ala. 27, 36 So. 2d
102 (1948) (same four judges dissent and uphold jury providence of the case);
Moore v. ChesapeakeO.
&
Ry., 340 U. 5. 573 (1951), a irming 184 F. 2d 176 (4th
Cir. 1950). Justice Black, with Douglas concurring i the dissent, says that the
majority of the court is upholding "a totally unvarranted substitution of a court's
view of the evidence for that of a jury." Id. at 431. All of these exceptions and
others are of little significance in view of the dissents and the great number of cases
contra. See note 26, infra.
"Carter v. Atlanta & St. A. B. Ry., 338 U. S.430 (1949), reversing 170 F.
2d 719 (5th Cir. 1948) ; O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 338 U. S.384 (1949),
reversing 171 F. 2d 973 (7th Cir. 1948) ; Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U. S. 294
(1949), reversing 77 Ga. App. 780, 49 S.E. 2d 833 (1948); Urie v. Thompson,
337 U. S.163 (1949), reversing 357 Mo. 738, 210 S.W. 2d 98 (1948) ; Wilkerson
v. McCarthy, 336 U. S.53 (1949), reversing 112 Utah 300, 187 P. 2d 188 (1947) ;
Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U. S. 520 (1948), reversing 112 Utah 166, 185
P. 2d 963 (1947) ; Anderson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 333 U. S.821 (1948) ;
reversing 13 Cal. 2d 117, 187 P. 2d 729 (1947) ; Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U. S.
459 (1947), reversing 162 F. 2d 716 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Myers v. Reading Co., 331
U. S. 477 (1947), reversing 155 F. 2d 523 (3d. Cir. 1946); Ellis v. Union
Pacific R. R., 329 U. S.452 (1947), reversing 146 Neb. 397, 19 N. W. 2d 641
(1945) ; Jesionowski v. Boston & M. R. R., 329 U. S.452 (1946), reversing 154
F. 2d 703 (1st Cir. 1946) ; Blair v. Baltimore & 0. R. R, 323 U. S.600 (1945),
rezersing 349 Pa. 436, 37 A. 2d 736 (1944) ; Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry., 321
U. S.29 (1944), reversing 134 F. 2d 860 (7th Cir. 1943); Owens v. Union Pacific
R. R., 319 U. S. 715 (1943), reversing 129 F. 2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1942) ; Bailey v.
Central Vermont Ry., 319 U. S. 350 "(1943), reversing 113 Vt. 8, 28 A. 2d 639
(1942) ; Tiller v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 318 U. S.54 (1943), reversing 128 F. 2d
420 (4th Cir. 1942), and 323 U. S.574 (1945), reversing 142 F. 2d 718 (4th Cir.
1944) ; Lilly v. Grand Trunk Ry., 317 U. S.481 (1943), reversing 312 Ill. App. 73,
37 N. E. 2d 888 (1941) ; Seago v. New York C. R. R., 315 U. S.781 (1942), reversing 155 S.W. 2d 126 (Mo. 1941).
"7Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S.645 (1946), reversin 354 Mo. 582, 189 S.W. 2d
253 (1945). Justice Murphy, writing the opinion of the court, said, "It is no
answer to say that the jury's verdict involved speculation and conjecture . .
Id. at 653.
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The Court has repeatedly justified its attitude with the quotation:
"We see no reason, so long as the jury system is the law of the land,
and the jury is made the tribunal to decide disputed questions of fact,
why it should not decide such questions as these . . .-28 As an consequence of this entrenched view, juries have, over the last decade, in effect
written the law with regard to FELA actions. 29 An injured railroad
employee may almost always be assured of having his case reach the
jury30 and may be fairly certain of a favorable verdict. 3 ' It was against
this background that the Texas court approved a jury trial rather than
deciding the case as a matter of law as the dissenting judges would have
32

done.

It appears that the Supreme Court will continue to lead lower
courts33 by its own reluctance to preclude any railroad employee from

recovery. 34 In view of this and other apparent discontent with FELA as
2 Jones v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. R., 128 U. S. 443, 445 (1888) (case involved negligence and contributory negligence). This reasoning is adopted by the
Texas court in Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R. v. Evans, 250 S. W. 2d 385, 392
(Texas 1952).
" "... it is not judicial legislation which has amended the bases of the FELA
action, but judicial alteration of its own procedure, wherein the judge-jury relation has been modified to conform to the philosophy of the majority of the Court.
The net result of the procedural alteration has been a change in the substantive
law." Note, 44 ILL. L. Rav. 854 (1950).
"See note 23 supra. "The jury is the tribunal under our federal system of
jurisprudence which determines whether the evidence in railroad cases produces
probative facts from which negligence and the causal relation may reasonably be
inferred." Moore, Recent Trends in Judicial Interpretation in Railroad Cases
Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 29 MARQ. L. REV. 73, 94 (1946).
See also Richter and Forer, Federal Employers' Liability Act-A Real Coinpensatory Law for Railroad Workers, 36 CORNELL L. Q. 203, 231 (1951) ; Note, 26
NOmE DAME LAW. 694 (1951).
" James, Functions of Judge and Jtry in Negligence Cases, 58 YALB L. Rzv.
667 (1949). The author takes cognizance of the fact that juries, in majority
of accident cases, return verdicts for plaintiffs. James suggests that this fact
has added significance when one remembers that most defendant's lawyers will
try to settle unfavorable claims out of court and take only doubtful cases to court.
'2Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R., 250 S. W. 2d 385, 393 (Texas 1952). See
Griswold v. Gardner, 155 F. 2d 333, 334 (7th Cir. 1946). The court affirmed
a jury verdict for plaintiff, but said "That the Supreme Court treats the question
of negligence and proximate cause as a jury question in this class of cases is
clearly shown by a study of these cases. Moreover, not only are the issues to be
decided by the jury but its decision is unassailable. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of a case brought under this act where a trial court would be justified in directing a verdict."
"... regardless of what we might think of the sufficiency of the evidence....
The fact is . . . that the Supreme Court has in effect converted this negligence
statute into a compensation law thereby making, for all practical purposes, a railroad an insurer of its employees." Id. at 333.
" See note 8 supra. "Our Supreme Court will not hesitate to spank a trial
judge or a court of appeals who has failed to heed its strong and oft-repeated
admonitions concerning the functions of the court and that of the jury. As a result, trial judges and courts have become fearful of directing verdicts or of entering judgments, notwithstanding the verdicts of juries." Dooley, The Meaning of
FELA to the Railroad Worker, 22 OKLA. B. A. J. 66, 67 (1951).
"Justice Frankfurter criticizes the need for showing negligence in industrial
accident cases as being outmoded and suggests absolute liability should be imposed on railroads and other large industries in a concurring opinion in Tiller
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it stands today,3 5 perhaps Congress should replace the Act with a comprehensive plan which would not require railroad workers to show that
their injury was proximately caused by negligence or violation of a
safety statute by the carrier but which would allow reasonable compensation"0 to railroad workers for all accidental injuries arising out of their
employment.3' Such legislation would eliminate the necessity of moldv. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 318 U. S. 54, 73 (1943).

Justices Black and Frankfurter
express similar concurring opinions in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53
(1949).
Justice Douglas, in Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U. S. 350, 354 (1943),
refers to the use of the doctrine of negligence and the jury trial as ".

.

. crude,

archaic, and expensive as compared with the more modern systems of workmen's
compensation." Dissenting, justice Roberts, with whom Justice Frankfurter concurred, said, "I yield to none in my belief in the wisdom and equity of workmen's compensation laws, but I do not conceive it to be within our judicial function to write
the policy which underlies compensation laws into acts of Congress (FELA)
when Congress has not chosen that policy but, instead, has adopted the common
law doctrine of negligence." Id. at 358.
'5 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 70, p. 547 (1941). With pertinent quotations and
citations, the author points to the increasing agitation for some sort of workmen's compensation act to supplant FELA. See 74 A. B. A. REP. 108 (1949).
A resolution was adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association to offer and support an amendment to FELA to the effect that an injured
employee be compelled to bring his cause of action under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the jurisdiction wherein the injury occurred, if such jurisdiction
has such an act, and that the employee not have an election of remedies. It further
provided that such action would be a bar to any proceeding on the claim under
the act of any other jurisdiction. See also Pollack, Worklnen's Compensation For
Railroad Work Injuries and Diseases, 36 CORNELL L. Q. 236 (1951). The author
urges enactment of a federal workmen's compensation act for railroad employees
and notes that approximately thirty bills have been before congress for such a
law. He also states the belief that a majority of railroad workers favor such
action, but indicates that some of the strongest opposition comes from employees.
See e.g., Lush, Importance of Legal Aid, The Railroad Trainman, Jan. 1947, p. 8.

The speaker, former manager of the legal aid department of the Brotherhood of

Railroad Trainmen, expresses aversion for compensation acts because of the ceilings on recovery and upholds FELA as being the better plan to compensate
workers for injuries.
Affolder v. New York C. & St. L. R. R., 339 U. S. 96 (1950) (jury awarded
$95,000 for loss of a leg; court reduced the sum to $80,000) ; Lavender v. Kurn,
327 U. S. 645 (1946) ($30,000 for death); Missouri, K. & T. R. R. v. Evans, 250
S. W. 2d 383 (Tex. 1952) (jury gave $40,000 for an eye; reduced by court to
$20,000) ; Missouri, K. & T. R. R v. Ridgeway, 191 F. 2d 363 (8th Cir. 1951)
(jury awarded damages fifty-five times greater than plaintiff's annual earning
capacity and nearly twice as much as plaintiff could earn in a normal lifetime if
he had not been partially crippled). In all of the preceding cases, it is doubtful
that the plaintiffs should have been sustained in their suits under FELA. Moreover, the damages awarded are illogical and incongruous.
Maximum recovery under the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act
for the four cases above would have been: (1) $6,000 for loss of leg, (2) $8,000
compensation plus $200 burial expenses for death, (3) $3,600 for loss of eye, and
(4) approximately $5,000 for partial loss of use of a hand and foot in the Ridgeway
case. See N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-29 through 31 (1943, recompiled 1950, Supp.
1951).
17 FELA contemplates compensation only for injuries caused by the violation
of some duty which employer, by statute, owes employee. See note 24 supra.
Theoretically, the Act does not cover purely accidental injuries as would a
workmen's compensation act. See, e. g., N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2 (f) (1943, recompiled 1950) (covers "injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment, and . . . disease . . . where it results unavoidably from accident").
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ing time-honored legal concepts of negligence, proximate cause, and jury
function to meet special needs in FELA cases.

Lucius W. PULLEN
Parties-joinder-Partially Subrogated Insurance Companies

The ultimate question decided in the principal case' was, "Where
the owner of an insured automobile brings an action for damages to his
automobile and for injury to his person against the supposed tort-feasor
whose negligence allegedly caused the damage and injury, may the court,

on motion of the supposed tort-feasor, bring into the case as an additional party an insurance company which has indemnified the owner for
only a part2 of the damage to the automobile?"8 It was answered
in the affirmative.

The court had never faced that precise question squarely. This is,
at least, partially understood when it is remembered that: "It can very
rarely happen that making an additional party will be a serious prejudice, and hence such orders are usually discretionary and not reviewable." ;4 unless the exercises of discretion by the court is refused upon
the ground that it has no power to grant the motion, in which case the
refusal is reviewable. 5 Any understanding thus gained fades, however,
with the realization that the party question may properly be included in
Thus, the workmen's compensation acts cover all accidental injuries connnected
with the employment, but with an unreasonably low ceiling on the amount recoverable, while FELA has no ceiling but does not cover all work-incurred injuries. See Baker v. Atlantic C. L. R R., 232 N. C. 523, 61 S. E. 2d 621 (1950),
cert. denied, 340 U. S. 939 (1951) (railroad not liable for death of repairman
where the motor car on which he was riding hit a dog and was wrecked) ; Moore
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 184 F. 2d 176 (4th Cir. 1950), affirmed, 340 U. S. 573
(1951) (railroad not liable where brakeman fell from engine and was killed in an
unexplained accident) ; A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1951,
29 N. C. L. Rlv. 351, 428 (1951). The suggested federal workmen's compensation
act should arise at the equitable point of convergence of the Federal Employer's
Act and the state workmen's compensation acts.
'Burgess v. Trevathan, 236 N. C. 157, -S. E. 2d- (1952).
Italics author's.
Burgess v. Trevathan, 236 N. C. 157, 159, -S. E. 2d- (1952).
'Bernard v. Shemwell, 139 N. C. 446, 447, 52 S. E. 64 (1905).
The inference is that the court did not consider premature and fragmentary an appeal
from an order making a new party where such order was on its face prejudicial.
See also: Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N. C. 528, 67 S. E. 2d 349 (1951) ; Service
Fire Ins. Co. v. Horton Motor Lines Inc., 225 N. C. 588, 35 S. E. 2d 879 (1945) ;
Home Loan and Ins. Co. v. Locker, 214 N. C. 1, 197 S. E. 555 (1938) ; Morgan v.
Turnage Co., Inc., 213 N. C. 425, 196 S. E. 307 (1938); Choate Rental Co. v.
Justice, 212 N. C. 523, 193 S. E. 817 (1937) ; Wilmington v. Board of Education,
210 N. C. 197, 185 S. E. 767 (1936) ; Goins v. Sargent, 196 N. C. 478, 146 S. E.
131 (1929) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-163, 173 (1943).
Gilchrist v. Kitchen, 86 N. C. 20 (1882). See also: Guy v. Baer, 234 N. C.
276, 67 S. E. 2d 47 (1951); Smith v. New York Life Insurance Co., 208 N. C.
99, 179 S. E. 457 (1935) ; Life Ins. Co of Va. v. Edgerton, 206 N. C. 402, 174 S. E.
96 (1934).
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an appeal after judgment.6 In the principal case the court dismissed the
appeal from an order making the insurer a party, but, nevertheless,
exercised its discretionary power to express an opinion 7 on the question
of substance." In its simplest form that question becomes, is an insurer,
in such a case, a proper party? Perhaps by analogy to our court's view
of the liability insurance cases, in which "evidence that a defendant
carried indemnity insurance is incompetent," some attorneys and, perhaps, some trial judges have reasoned or assumed a negative answer.
This concept could not have stemmed from statutory construction.
On the contrary, our statutes provide in express terms that "all persons
having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief
demanded may be joined as plaintiffs, either jointly, severally, or in the
alternative,"' 1 and that "all persons may be made defendants, jointly,
severally, or in the alternative, who have, or claim, an interest in the
controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who are necessary parties to a
complete determination or settlement of the question involved.""
Our statute which specifies that "every action must be prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest 'u 2 is, by its language, pertinent only
in that it requires the presence of an insurer where subrogation is com4
plete03 or where the insured has relinquished all his beneficial interest.1
It does not, on its face, preclude joinder of an insurer as a proper party.
Nor do the cases support this apparent misconception of the law.
In Powell v. Water Co. 15 the following principles were said to be
established: (1) The right of action to recover damages from the tortfeasor is in the insured, and this action is indivisible. (2) Upon payment
of the insurance the insurer is subrogated'0 to the rights of the insured
as against the tort-feasor to the extent of such payment. (3) Full payment of the loss by the insurer results in an equitable assignment of the
Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N. C. 529, 67 S. E. 2d 349 (1951) ; Service Fire Ins.
Co. v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 225 N. C. 588, 35 S. E. 2d 879 (1945) ; Wilmington v. Board of Education, 210 N. C. 197, 185 S. E. 767 (1936) ; Bernard v.
Shemwell, 139 N. C. 446, 52 S. E. 2d 64 (1905).
Cement Co. v. Phillips, 182 N. C. 437, 109 S. E. 257 (1921) ; Milling Co. v.
Finlay, 110 N. C. 412, 15 S. E. 4 (1892).
' See text at note 3.
'Bell

v. Panel Co, 210 N. C. 813, 814, 188 S. E. 621 (1936).

For an

interesting discussion of the underlying rational of this view see, Baer, The

Relative Roles of Legal Rules and Non-Legal Factors ht Accide't Litigation, 31
N. C. L. Rv.46, 55 (1952).
"1N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-68 (1943).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-69 (1943).
"IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1943).

"' Cunningham v. Seaboard R. R., 139 N. C. 437, 51 S. E. 1029 (1905).
"'Powell v. Water Co., 171 N. C. 290, 88 S. E. 426 (1916); Underwood v.

Dooley, 197 N. C. 100, 147 S. E. 646 (1929).

N. C. 290, 88 S. E. 426 (1916).
"'Id.at 296, 88 S. E. at 429, for a discussion of the rationale underlying subrogation in regard to insurance contracts. See also Lumberman's Ins. Co. v.
Southern Ry., 179 N. C. 255, 102 S. E. 417 (1920).
"5171
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whole claim, which may thereafter be prosecuted in the name of the insurer. (4) Partial payment of the loss by the insurer results in a
partial assignment only, and as the action is indivisible, it must be
brought in the name of the insured. (5) A release by the insured does
not extinguish the right of subrogation.
From these principles the court concluded that where the insured
settles with the tort-feasor for that portion of the loss not paid him
by the insurer, the cause of action would be in the insurer, for the
reason that the insured has parted with all his beneficial interest in the
right of action. Thus, the insurer became the real party in interest, a
necessary party to the action.
In Underwood v. Dooley,'17 the plaintiff sued for personal injuries
substained in an automobile accident. The defendant moved for dismissal on the grounds (1) that there was, at the 'date of the commencement of this suit, pending against him in another court of competent
jurisdiction a suit for damages occasioned by the same accident and to
an automobile belonging to the plaintiff, said suit having been brought
by an insurer who had paid the plaintiff in full for damages to his automobile, and (2) that, since the commencement of this action, a final
judgment had been rendered in said action against the 'defendant, which
he has paid and fully satisfied. The motion was denied, and on appeal,
the court, recognizing the principle that two actions on the same cause
and between the same parties will not lie,' 8 affirmed the order denying
the motion. The court necessarily adopted the rule that an indivisible
cause of action may be divided by acts of the parties. 19
In Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 20 an insurer

which had paid the insured in part only for damages to his automobile, 2'
without alleging affirmatively that it had fully paid the insured's claim,
brought suit to recover from the wrong-doer. The defendant demurred on
the ground that the action was indivisible and could not be brought by the
17197 N. C. 100, 147 S.E. (1929).

"8"Where an action is instituted, and it appears to the court by plea, answer
or demurrer that there is another action pending between the same parties, and
substantially on the same subject matter, and that all material questions and rights
can be determined therein, such action will be dismissed." Alexander v.Norwood
118 N. C. 381, 382, 24 S. E. 119 (1896). See also: Cameron v. Cameron, 235
N. C. 82, 68 S.E. 2d 796 (1951) ; Dwiggins v. Bus Co., 230 N. C. 234, 52 S.E. 2d
892 (1949).
"In cases not involving insurance, personal injuries and property damages sustained by the same individual in the same accident give rise to a single and indivisible cause of action. Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N. C. 100, 147 S. E. 646
(1929); Barcliff v. Southern R. R, 176 N. C. 39, 96 S. E. 644 (1918); Eller
v. Norfolk C. and N. W. R R-, 140 N. C. 140, 52 S. E. 305 (1905).
20225 N. C. 588, 35 S.E. 2d 879 (1945).
2 The complaint alleged that before and after the collision the automobile was
worth $600 and $136.50 respectively. It follows that the damage was $463.50.
The insurer paid the owner $413.50, thereby indicating a "$50 deductable"' situation; however, the court did not recognize this as conclusive that the cause had
been split and, therefore, not maintainable.
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insurer, whereupon, and before a ruling on the demurrer, the insurer
moved that the insured be made a party. On appeal from an order
allowing the motion, the court affirmed. Here, by implication at least,
the court sanctions the joinder of insurer and insured in a partial
22
subrogation situation.
From these cases 2- and the pertinent statutes24 it becomes apparent
that there has been no valid basis for 'doubting a trial judge's discretionary power to grant a motion to join insurer an insured in cases of the
nature presented by the principal case. It should be noted that such
joinder is still within the discretion of the trial judge. The insurer is a
proper party, but not a necessary party. However, in the principal
case the court seems to recommend, as well as authorize, such joinders.25
While apparently holding that a partially subrogated insurer may be
joined as either plaintiff or defendant at the instance of either the wrongdoer or the insured, the court observed that the most effective procedure
in such a situation would be to move that the insurer "be made an additional party defendant and required to answer, setting up its claim aris'26
ing through subrogation.
Also, the court said that "the insured may be properly joined as a
party defendant under G. S. 1-69 even in an action where the insurance
company sues the tort-feasor to enforce subrogation on the theory that
''
the insured has been indemnified by it for the full amount of the loss. 27
28
Quoting from a Wisconsin case, the court said this was true because
"it frequently is not ascertainable until the verdict establishes the amount
of the damages whether insurer is sole or partial owner of the cause of
action, since, if the amount of damages set by the jury is less than the
insurance paid, insurer is the sole owner, whereas, if the amount is
greater, insurer is only a partial owner." 29 Such joinder will, no doubt,
expedite the trial and final settlement; however, if the insured has, in
fact, accepted settlement in full, the reason adopted by the court is, in the
opinion of the author, unsound. It is inconsistent with the theory upon
which such a suit is brought, that is, that the insurer has paid the in" For an identical result see Lumberman's Ins. Co. v. Southern Ry.,
179 N. C. 255, 102 S. E. 417 (1920).
McINTosu,

For comment approving such joinder see
NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES § 218

(1929).

"Supra at notes 15, 17 and 20.
"Supra at notes 10, 11 and 12.

"The court cited Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Basnight, 234 N. C.

347, 67 S. E. 2d 390 (1951) as authority for the proposition that the insurer had
a direct and appreciable interest in the subject matter of the action, and by reason
thereof was a proper party to the action. In that case the court sttrongly recommended the joinder of parties who were not necessary parties but who had an ascertainable interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
" Burgess v. Trevathan, 236 N. C. 157, 162, -S. E. 2d- (1952).
.9 Id.

Patitucci v. Gerhardt, 206 Wis. 358, 240 N. W. 385 (1932).
20Id. at 363, 240 N. W. at 386.
's
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sured in full for the amount of the loss. Furthermore, the probability is remote that the insurer, in such a case, would pray for damages
in excess of the amount paid the insured. To do so would, it seems, admit partial subrogation only. And, it is even harder to conceive a jury
verdict in excess of the amount the insured had accepted as full payment
of his claim against the wrong-doer. The verdict is more likely to be
less.30
The question remains whether a partially subrogated insurer can
avoid joinder in a suit by the insured simply by failing, under agreement with the insured or otherwise, to indemnify the insured to any degree. The general language of the cases indicates that it can do so.
Actual payment 3' is regarded by our court as the necessary
basis for subrogation. It would seem, then, that a mere obligation to pay
would not ,give rise to a claim in the insurer, and that, consequently,
joinder of an insurer who had made no payment to the insured is at
odds with the principles of subrogation.
It is submitted, however, that, other things being equal, there is little
practical difference in a paid and non-paid situation. In either case the
insurer has a very distinct interest in the subject matter of the suit.
It seems entirely possible that if an insurer makes partial settlement
after the insured has brought the action, but before trial, the insurer
could at that time properly be made a party.
D. STEPHEN JONES
Real Property-Powers of Attorney-Wife's Conveyance of Her
Realty By Virtue of Husband's Power of Attorney
W, a married woman, owns real estate in North Carolina. Her husband, H, is in the armed forces. Before departing for a tour of duty in
Korea H executes, in proper form, a power of attorney' authorizing W
to assent in his behalf to conveyances of her separate realty. Three
months later, while H is overseas, W conveys a house and lot to X,
executing the 'deed both for herself and on behalf of H by virtue of his
power of attorney. Shortly thereafter W dies and H is killed in action.
" Baer, The Relative Roles of Legal Rules And Non-Legal FactorsIt; Accident
Litigation, 31 N. C. L. REv. 46, 55 (1952).
" An advancement by the insurer to the insured "pending collection from the
carrier or other bailee" was said to be actual payment. Cunningham v. Seaboard
R. R., 139 N. C. 427, 433, 51 S. E. 1029, 1030 (1905).
' It should be noted at the outset that the power under discussion here is not
the general type whereby H authorizes W to convey his land, but is a special
power granted to W by H to join on his behalf in conveyances of her separate
realty. See Toulmin v. Heidelberg, 32 Miss. 268 (1856) where it was held that
a power to execute conveyances of H's land was not the same as a power to join
with the wife in a conveyance of her land. For a general discussion with respect
to scope of powers of attorney, see 2 C. J. S. Agency §§ 98 and 99 (1936).
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W's only heir at law brings an action against X to recover the property.
Who will succeed7
While at common law the wife was permitted to retain the fee to her
lands, she could not convey the same. 2 At an early date, however, a
married woman in the Colonies was allowed by local custom or statute
to convey her real estate by deed in which the husband joined and which
she acknowledge by privy examination. 3 That joinder requirement was
incorporated in the North Carolina Constitution by a provision 4 which
states, in effect, that a married woman may convey her real5 and personal,
property as though unmarried if she gets the written assent of her husband.7 This constitutional provision has been implemented by a statutes
declaring that the wife's conveyance must be executed by herself and her
husband. Since no case has yet been decided by the North Carolina
Supreme Court construing the constitutional provision and statutes as
they concern the validity of a married woman's conveyance of her separate real estate, executed by her both on her own behalf and on behalf
of her husband by virtue of his power of attorney, it is appropriate to
examine the manner in which this problem has been dealt with in other
jurisdictions. 9
2

1 PowELL

oN REAL PRoPERTY

430 (1949); 3

VERNIER,

AmERIcAN FAMILY

LAWS 293 (1935).
33 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS

293 (1935).
'N. C. CONsT. Art. X, § 6. "The real and personal property of any female in

this state acquired before marriage, and all property, real and personal, to which
she may, after marriage, become in any manner entitled, should be and remain the
sole and separate estate and property of such female, and shall not be liable for
any debts, obligations, or engagements of her husband, and may be devised and bequeathed, and, with the written assent of her husband, conveyed by her as if she
were unmarried."
' This provision applies to equitable as well as legal estates in land owned
It applies also to the
by the wife. Clayton v. Rose, 87 N. C. 106 (1882).

release by the wife of her dower. Slocumb v. Ray, 123 N. C. 571, 31 S. E. 829
(1898).
1 In Vann v. Edwards, 135 N. C. 661, 47 S. E. 784 (1904), overruing Walton
v. Bristol, 125 N. C. 419, 34 S. E. 544 (1899), it was held that the wife could dispose of her separate property without the consent of her husband, unless the law
requires its disposition to be evidenced by a conveyance or writing. Later, in
Rea v. Rea, 156 N. C. 529, 72 S. E. 873 (1911), the constitutional provision was
virtually nullified as to personalty, it being held that the wife has an unrestricted
power to convey her personal property.
Exceptions to the general rule exist in the following instances: A woman
living separate from her husband under a divorce or deed of separation executed
by husband and wife, or whose husband has been declared an idiot or lunatic, may
convey without her husband's consent. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 52-5 (1943, recompiled 1950). A woman whose husband abandons her may convey without
her husband's consent. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (1943, recompiled 1950).
s "Every conveyance, power of attorney, or other instrument affecting the
estate, right or title of any married woman in lands, tenements or hereditaments
must be executed by such married woman and her husband . . ." N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 39-7 (1943, recompiled 1950).
' At the present time only six states-Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Pennsylvania,
North Carolina, and Texas-require the husband's joinder in order that the wife
may make an effective conveyance of her interest in realty. In three of theseFlorida, Indiana, and Pennsylvania-a statute provides that the husband may give
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Such a conveyance was held invalid in a California case10 decided
under a joinder statute" similar to that in North Carolina. The California court held that the purpose of the joinder requirement was to insure the wife the protection of her husband against wily third parties
who might seek to profit by taking advantage of her inexperience in
real estate transactions. To make this protection effectual the husband
should exercise his judgment in respect to each transaction of the wife
with respect to her real estate. Exercise of this discretion through the
medium of a power of attorney granted the wife in advance would, in
effect, operate as an abdication by the husband of that discretionary
function. The husband should exercise that discretion by signing each
deed himself.
Conversely, in a Texas case 12 decided under a statute'3 requiring that
there be a joint conveyance from the husband and wife for the wife's separate realty, a conveyance of her property executed by the wife on behalf
of her husband by virtue of his power of attorney was held valid. This
court found nothing in its previous decisions declaring it essential for
the husband to counsel the wife in respect to her real estate transfers.
Furthermore, the statute 'did not specifically indicate in what way the
husband should effect his joinder, whether in person or by an attorney
in fact. Since in Texas the husband and wife could convey the wife's
separate property through an agent by their joint power of attorney,
the court thought that the husband could, by his separate power of attorney, authorize another to execute for him, jointly with his wife, a
conveyance of her property.' 4 If this power could be delegated to a
stranger, why not to the wife? The court saw no harm in leaving the
manner in which the joint conveyance was to be effected to the discretion of the parties.
the wife his power of attorney authorizing her to execute for him, and in his
name, jointly with herself, a deed of conveyance of her separate property. FLA.
STAT. ANN. 708.09 (1944); IND. STAT. ANN. 56-10 (Burns supp. 1951); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 48 § 32 (1931).
In a fourth, Texas, the conveyance in question
has been upheld by judicial decision.

Rogers v. Roberts, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 140,

35 S. W. 76 (1896). In Alabama and North Carolina there appears to be neither
statute nor reported decision with respect to this particular matter.
"Meagher v. Thompson, 49 Calif. 189 (1874).
"... no alienation, sale or conveyance of the real property of the wife .. .
shall be valid for any purpose unless the same be made by an instrument in writing,
executed by the husband and wife . . ." CAL. STAT. p. 518 (1862). It should be
noted, however, that the joinder requirement was abolished in California in 1872.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 162 (1949).
'
Rogers v. Roberts, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 190, 35 S. W. 76 (1896).
'*"The
husband and wife shall join in the conveyance of real estate the
separate property of the wife ... " Tzx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1299 (Supp.
1945).
14
See Toulmin v. Heidelberg, 32 Miss. 268 (1856), decided when Mississippi

had a joinder requirement, where it was stated that the husband's power authorizing his attorney to join with the wife in a conveyance of her realty would suffice
to permit the wife and the husband's attorney to convey the wife's property.
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If called upon to resolve the problem, it is not unlikely that the
North Carolina court would look to other jurisdictions. Thus it is significant that each of the solutions indicated above is based to some extent
on factors which also exist in North Carolina. For instance, as did the
California court, the North Carolina court has emphasized that the
purpose of the husband's joinder is not to convey an interest in the
property, because he has none, but to protect the wife. 15 In order that
the wife obtain this protection the North Carolina court, like the court
in California, has held it necessary that the husband sign the same deed
as the wife. 16 Viewed solely in the light of these considerations, in
North Carolina a deed of the wife's separate property wherein she signs
both for herself and on behalf of her husband would be invalid.
On the other hand, as in Texas, the North Carolina statute17 does not
indicate in what way the husband should effect his joinder, whether in
person or by an attorney in fact.

i8
The North Carolina Constitution

requires only the written assent of the husband, and does not state
whether this written assent must appear on the dleed itself. Furthermore, since in North Carolina, as in Texas, the husband and wife can
convey the wife's separate property through an agent by their joint
power of attorney, 19 there is little doubt that the husband can, by his
separate power of attorney, authorize another person, such as his real
estate broker, to execute for him, jointly with his wife, a conveyance of
" Joiner v. Firemens Insurance Company, 6 F. Supp. 103 (M. D. N. C. 1932) ;

Buford v. Mochy, 224 N. C. 235, 29 S. E. 2d 729 (1944); Stallings v. Walker,

176 N. C. 321, 97 S. E. 25 (1918) ; Ferguson v. Kinsland, 93 N. C. 337 (1885).
But see Smith v. Bruton, 137 N. C. 79, 87, 49 S. E. 64, 67 (1904) (Dissenting
opinion).
The assertion that the purpose of the husband's joinder is not to convey
an interest in property does not apply to property owned by the husband and
wife by the entireties, since in such a case the husband does have an interest
to convey. Technically speaking, since H and W both own an interest, in order
that W convey property owned by the entireties she needs both the power to
convey H's interest in land and the power to join on his behalf in conveyances
of her interest. Although it is true that the power to convey H's land does not
include the power to join in conveyances of W's land (note 1, supra), it seems
logical that in the case of an estate owned by the entireties, since both H and W
own the same interest, H's grant of the power to sell that interest would necessarily
include his assent to the alienation by W.
"8Council v. Pridgen, 153 N. C. 444, 69 S. E. 404 (1910) ; Slocumb v. Ray, 123
N. C. 571, 31 S. E. 829 (1898) ; Green v. Bennett, 120 N. C. 394, 27 S. E. 142
(1897) ; Ferguson v. Kinsland, 93 N. C. 337 (1885).
In Joiner v. Firemens Insurance Company, 6 F. Supp. 103 (M. D. N. C. 1932),
overruling Gray v. Mathis, 52 N. C. 503 (1860), it was held that it is not necessary
that the husband's name be in the body of the deed.
In Bates v. Sultan, 117 N. C. 95, 23 S. E. 261 (1895) and Brinkley v. Ballance, 126 N. C. 393, 35 S. E. 631 (1900) judgments against a married woman
were declared charges against her separate estate, which included land, although
the husband had assented in a separate writing to the wife's charging her separate
estate as security for payment of debts, non-payment of which gave rise to the
judgments. The value of these cases as precedent is limited, since in neither was
an actual conveyance involved.
1? See note 8, supra.
18 See note 4, supra.
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 39-12 (1943, recompiled 1950).
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her property. Why should he not be able to grant this authority to his
wife ?
It is submitted that North Carolina should follow the Texas rather
than the California decision, which is seventy-five years old and no
longer law in that jurisdiction.2 0 Although the reasoning advanced as a
basis for that decision, as well as for numerous North Carolina decisions
requiring the husband to manifest his assent by signing each deed, has
not been refuted by the North Carolina court, it could hardly be argued
that it has any force today. If it is recognized that married women as a
group are no longer ignorant and inexperienced, and that they are as capable as their single sisters of profitably disposing of their real estate,
what justification is there for requiring them to obtain their husbands'
advice with respect to their transfer of such property?
There are other considerations, not mentioned in the Texas decision,
which indicate that the husband should be permitted to accomplish his
joinder through a power of attorney authorizing the wife to assent to
conveyances of her property on his behalf, some of which are:
(1) As hereinabove indicated, 2' such a holding would be in accord
with the law in at least 46 other states.
(2) In North Carolina a married woman is free to devise2 2 her
property as she sees fit without consulting anyone. Likewise, she has
23
complete freedom of disposition in respect to her personal property,
the value of which frequently is greater than that of her real estate.
This being so, there should be no objection to her conveying her separate real estate with the consent of her husband, voluntarily granted in
his power of attorney.
(3) Although not mentioned in the 'decisions24 or statutes, it may be
that one reason for retaining the joinder requirement in North Carolina
is to protect the husband's curtesy consummate, or life estate in the lands
of the wife in the event of her death, issue of the marriage having beern
born alive.25 If this be so, the husband should be permitted to release
this right if he wishes by authorizing his wife to assent to conveyances
of her realty on his behalf.
28
(4) A policy in North Carolina is to make land freely alienable.
See note 11, supra.
21 See note 9, supra.
N. C. GENr. STAT. § 31-2 (1943, recompiled 1950).
See note 6, supra.
"But see Smith v. Bruton, 137 N. C. 137 N. C. 79, 87, 49 S. E. 64, 67 (1904)
(Dissenting opinion) where Chief Justice Clark declared that the constitutional
provision requiring the husband's assent was intended to protect the husband's
curtesy and was merely a correlative of the wife's joining in the husband's conveyances to bar her dower.
- For a detailed discussion of curtesy in North Carolina see McCall and
Langston, A New Intestate Succession Statute for North Carolina. 11 N. C. L.
R.y. 266, 273-294 (1933).
"' Combs v. Paul, 191 N. C. 789, 133 S. E. 93 (1926) ; Pritchard v. Bailey, 113
N. C. 521, 18 S. E. 668 (1893).
20
22
2
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Since so many married men are out of the continental United States, due
primarily to service in the armed forces, a procedure is needed whereby a
serviceman's wife owning an interest in real estate may convey the same
without it being necessary that the husband assent in personm27 The

method under discussion fills that need.
A positive decision on this matter is needed in North Carolina, both
in order to cure the possible defect in titles already transferred in this
manner and so that attorneys may confidently recommend this procedure to clients. Since it may take some time for a test case to reach the
Supreme Court, it remains for the legislature to fill the gap by enacting

legislation authorizing the wife to join on behalf of her husband by his
28
power of attorney, as was done in Florida, Indiana, and Pennsylvania.
This would enable a married woman, whose husband is unavailable, to
exercise the freedom of transfer which she needs should circumstances
arise which make it necessary for her to dispose of her separate interest
29
in real estate.
TENcH C. CoxE, III
Torts-Emotional Distress-Negligent Infliction of Fear For
Safety of Another
The evolution of recovery for emotional disturbance has been a slow
and often illogical process. In order to observe briefly this development,
the following categories of cases involving emotional disturbance should
be considered: (1) assault on P; (2) intentional infliction of mental 'disturbance on P; (3) negligence toward P; (4) intentional tort toward
another which is treated as negligence toward P; (5) negligence toward
another which also is negligence toward P. Assault, as the first stage in
this development, recognized a freedom from fear of immediate bodily
harm.' Today there is a growing recognition of the intentional infliction
of emotional distress as a tort in itself; and unlike assault, there is no
" It should be noted that N. C. GEN. STAT. § 39-8 (1943, recompiled 1950)
permits the husband to join in the deed at a different time and place from the wife,
so she may mail him the deed, requesting that he sign and mail it back. This,
however, is at best a cumbersome and time-consuming procedure.
28 See note 9, supra.
22 The practice of permitting the husband to'manifest his written assent to his
wife's conveyances through his power of attorney provides a method which gives the
wife complete freedom of transfer, if she secures her husband's power of attorney.
A more direct method, and one which would give a married woman absolute freedom of transfer, would be provided by eliminating the joinder requirement altogether. In an era of substantially equal rights as between men and women in
almost every respect, such a requirement is admittedly outmoded. It is to be hoped
that the legislature will soon take the action necessary in order that the constitutional provision which makes the husband's written assent mandatory be submitted to the voters for possible amendment.
'I. de S. et ux. v. W. de S., Y. B. Lib. Ass., f. 99, pl. 60 (1348).
case is considered the historical origin of assault.

This "hatchet"
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limitation to fear of immediate bodily harm.2 In these two categories
defendant's conduct is intentional, and the absence of physical consequences does not preclude the recovery of damages. However, generally, in the field of negligent infliction of mental anguish, in the absence of some impact, there must be resulting physical consequences to
warrant recovery of damages.8 A majority of jurisdictions allow P to
recover for negligence which causes him mental anguish resulting in illness. 4 D's intentional tort toward another has been treated as negligence
toward P where illness followed the shock. 5 As to the fifth category,
where D's negligence imperils another for whose safety P fears and
suffers mental anguish resulting in physical consequences, American
courts are hesitant to award damages.
This hesitancy is illustrated in Resavage v. Davies,0 a recent Maryland decision which affirmed a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. It was
alleged that plaintiff was on her front porch when she saw defendant
motorist negligently kill her two children down on the street corner.
She suffered mental anguish resulting in physical consequences. The
2
RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 46 (Supp. 1948). The following cases appear to hold
that mental anguish is sufficient in itself without a showing of physical illness:
Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N. W. 25 (1932) ; Quina v.
Roberts, 16 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1944); La Salle Extension University v.
Fagarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N. W. 424 (1934).
Other cases seem to regard physical illness as essential to the cause of action.
See Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 70 App. D. C. 183, 105 F. 2d 62
(1939) ; Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N. C. 808, 188 S. E. 825 (1936);
Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 254, 135 P. 2d 330 (1943).
In other cases illness resulted. See State Rubbish Collectors Assn. v. Siliznoff,
240 P. 2d 282 (Cal. 1952) ; Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 313, 216 P. 2d
571 (1950) ; Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App. 2d 313, 198 P. Zd 696 (1948) ; Nickerson
v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920); Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q. B. 57

(1897).

'Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N. W. 890 (1938); Chiuchiluo v.
New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N. H. 329, 150 Atl. 540 (1930) ; Lambert v.
Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S. E. 244 (1924). Exceptions to the general rule
are: (1) Telegraph Cases, that is, the negligent transmission of death messages
which indicate on their face that mental anguish may result, See Telegraph
Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930); Mentzer v. Telegraph Co.,
93 Iowa 752, 62 N. W. 1 (1895); Russ v. Telegraph Co., 222 N. C. 504, 23 S. E.
2d 681 (1942). (2) Negligent Mishandling of Corpses. Recovery in these cases
is based on a quasi-property right in the body of a dead person. See Klumbach v.
Silver Mount Cemetery Assn. 242 App. Div. 843, 275 N. Y. Supp. 180 (1934);
Morrow v. Cline, 211 N . C. 254, 190 S. E. 207 (1937). See also, for discussion of
quasi-property right, Note, 30 N. C. L. Rav. 299 (1952).
"Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235 N. W. 335 (1931); Chiuchiolo v. New
England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N. H. 329, 150 Ati. 540 (1930) ; Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N. C. 398, 55 S. E. 778 (1906) ; Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co., 131 N. C.
536, 42 S. E. 983 (1902); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 313, 436 (1934).
I 'Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S. W. 59 (1890), Hallen, Hill v. Kimball-A
Milepost in the Law, 12 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1933) ; Martin v. Spencer, 221 N. C.
28, 18 S. E. 2d 703 (1942) ; Duncan v. Donnell, 12 S. W. 2d 811 (Tex. Civ. A pp.
1929); Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S. E. 244 (1924). See also
Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 Pac. 429 (1916), which presents the theory of
"transferred intent" rather than negligence.
0 86 A. 2d 879 (Md. 1952).
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court declared there was no duty to plaintiff and consequently no negligence since she herself was in no immediate peril.
Those courts allowing recovery for the physical consequences of
"fear for the safety of another" negligently imperiled, do so on the theory
of negligence toward the plaintiff. Another Maryland case7 allowed
damages for a father's fear for his children and fear for himself. However, the fact that he himself was imperiled was the basis for the duty to
him. Therefore, damages may be awarded against a negligent dlefendant
for "fear for the safety of another" when there is "fear for self" at the
same time." "There is neither logic nor reason to hold... that a distinction is to be taken so that, if a party suffer an injury, as loss of health, of
mind, or of life, through fear of safety for self, a recovery may be had for
the negligent act of another; but may not recover under similar circumstances, if the fear be of safety for another 9
In the above cases "fear for self" might be regarded as a peg for
recovery for "fear for the safety of another", that is, a basis for establishing negligence toward the plaintiff.'0 "It is predicted that if we require
the plaintiff to be in danger of ... fear for his own safety, many courts
will be equally quick to find these elements."' ' It seems that this element of constructive peril for self was found in Webb v. Lewald Coal
Co.,' 2 where plaintiff was on the second floor of a building when defendant's vehicle ran into the ground floor underneath her. She suffered
mental anguish and testified that she "felt sure he [the driver] would be
killed." The court inferred a "fear for oneself" and allowed recovery
rather than order a new trial so that upon cross examination, the jury
might 'determine whether she actually feared for herself.
Hanmbrook v. Stokes Bros.'3 is the leading case for the proposition
that one might recover purely on the grounds of "fear for the safety of
another". A mother on the sidewalk saw a driverless truck running
away due to defendant's negligence. Realizing it had come from the
direction her children were traveling, she turned back and ran uphill to
the scene of the accident. From there she went to the hospital, and the
shock of seeing her child in a critical condition caused her subsequent
" Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 Atl. 182 (1933). ("... . the nervous
shock or fright sustained by the plaintiff was based on reasonable grounds for apprehension
of an injury to the plaintiff and his children.").
8
Id., accord, Webb v. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 4 P. 2d 532 (1931);
Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440 (1918).
'Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 401, 165 Atl. 182, 183 (1933).
" An analogy may be drawn between this peg and the outmoded and forsaken
peg of impact, which in the past served as a basis for allowing recovery for "fear
for self".
" Hallen, Damages For Physical Injuries Resulting From Fright or Shock,
19 VA. L. Rtv. 253, 271 (1933), quoted in, Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232,
240, 280 N. W. 890, 893 (1938).
. 214 Cal. 182, 4 P. 2d 532 (1931).
18 1 K. B. 141 (1925).
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miscarriage and death. The King's Bench Division ordered a new trial
on the grounds that it was not necessary for the jury to determine that
the mother's shock was produced by fear for herself. Thereby a cause
of action was established against a negligent defendant for "fear for
another's safety". Although it may be argued that the plaintiff in this
case was in possible danger to herself, this was not the opinion of the
dissent nor was there any mention of "fear for one's own safety" ex14
cept to say that it was unnecessary. Also, in other cases in accord,
plaintiff could not possibly have been subjected to the same danger as
the one for whom she feared.
The courts which allow recovery for "fear for the safety of another"
impose certain limitations. Who may recover-a parent, child, spouse,
or total stranger? In all the cases cited with the exception of two, 15
the plaintiff was a parent. The Restatement of Torts seemingly would
limit recovery to parents and spouses. 16 Recovery beyond immediate
relatives would be an unreasonable extension of duty.' 7 When may
one recover-when he hears about the accident from others or hears or
sees it himself ? The cases cited limit recovery to seeing the peril or, as
Hambrook v. Stokes Bros. put it, .....that the shock resulted from what
the plaintiff's wife either saw or realized by her own unaided senses, and
not from something which some one told her. .. ".18s Such witnessing
or seeing must be simultaneous with the accident or peril and not several
hours later. As to how serious the peril or accident must be there is
no judicial authority. 19 Clearly it should be such that plaintiff as a
reasonable person would suffer mental anguish.
North Carolina has yet to decide whether there is a cause of action
for "fear for the safety of another" based on 'defendant's negligent conduct. It is hoped that once confronted with the situation of the principal
14 Rasmussen v. Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N. W. 890 (1938) ; Cohn v. Ansonia
Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N. Y. Supp. 39 (1914). In these cases since
there was no mention of "fear for self" and there was no apparent danger of direct physical harm, there is an inference that the duty to plaintiff was not to subject her to the mental anguish and resulting illness which she suffered. Compare
Hambrook v. Stokes Bros. with Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So.
927 (1912) ; Alabama Fuel Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916),
although D's conduct was intentional, it was negligent toward the one for whom
P feared.
(Fear for a
15Webb v. Lewald Coal Co.. 214 Cal. 182, 4 P. 2d 532 (1931)
stranger. The case was decided on the basis of "fear for self".) ; Rasmussen v.
Benson, 135 Neb. 232, 280 N. W. 890 (1938) (A business man's fear for safety
of customers.).
2' RESTATENT, TORTS § 313, Caveat (1934).
17 Several states, by statute in wrongful death actions, allow recovery to a close
relative for the relative's own mental anguish as distinguished from that possibly
suffered by the deceased. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.03 (1941) ; LA. R-v. STAT. art.
2315 (West 1952) (note 324) ; S. C. CODF ANN. § 412 (1942) ; VA. CoDs ANN.

§ 8-636 (1950) ; W.

VA. CODE
1 K. B. 141, 152 (1925).
" See note 17 supra.

18
9

ANN.

§ 5475 (1949).
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case involving a parent seeing the negligent killing of her children, our
court will allow recovery for such mental anguish and resulting illness
of the parent.
JOHN RANDOLPH INGRAM

Torts-Independent Tort Feasors-Joint and Several Liability
A recent Texas decision 1 has evidenced once again the difficulty

'Landers
1952).

v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S. W. 2d 731 (Tex.

which has faced the court over the years in deciding whether the acts
of two or more wrongdoers are such as to make them jointly and severally liable for the damages resulting from their combined acts. There
A, an oil company, and B, a salt water disposal company, negligently
permitted their respective pipe lines, running adjacent to plaintiff's land,
to break on or about the same day. Salt water from B's pipes and a
salt water-oil mixture from A's pipes flowed into a stream, thence emptying into plaintiff's fishing lake, killing the fish and causing other
damage. The court held the two companies liable jointly and severally
as joint tort feasors although there had been no unity of purpose or design, and each had acted independently in conducting its business.
The cases presenting the problem of joint and several liability may
be analyzed into two major categories: (1) Where the acts of two or
more wrongdoers combine to produce a single harmful result, the act
of one being in itself insufficient to produce the injury, and (2) Where
the acts of two or more wrongdoers combine to produce a single harmful result, the act of one alone being sufficient to produce the injury.
The general rule applied to factual situations typifying the first category is that causes of action arising from the acts of independent tort
feasors each of which inflicts some lamage, absent concert of action and
common intent, create no joint and several liability but each is responsible only for that portion of the injuries due to his negligence. 2
_ Glenn v. Chenowth, 71 Ariz. 271, 226 P. 2d 165 (1952) ; Miller v. Highland
Ditch Co., 87 Cal. 430, 25 Pac. 550 (1891); Symmes v. Pebble Phosphate Co.,
66 Fla. 27, 63 So. 1 (1913) ; Harley v. Merrill Brick Co., 83 Iowa 73, 48 N. W.
1000 (1891) ; Garret v. Garret, 228 N. C. 530, 46 S. E. 2d 302 (1948) ; Rice v.
McAdams, 149 N. C. 29, 62 S. E. 774 (1908) ; Sun Co. v. Wyatt, 48 Tex. Civ.

App. 349 (1908).
With the exception of Kansas3 and Oklahoma,4 this rule has been
'Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., 52 F. 2d 364 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U. S.
667 (1931). McDaniel v. Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 Pac. 899 (1913).
'Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153 Okla. 137, 5 P. 2d 389 (1931)
(and cases
cited therein).

most frequently applied by all jurisdietions in the pollution, diversion,
obstruction, or flooding of a stream by various independent proprietors, 5
Veryheyen v. Dewey, 27 Idaho 1, 146 Pac. 1116 (1915) (flooding
erty) ; Watson v. Pyramid Oil Co., 198 Ky. 135, 248 S. W. 227 (1923) ;
v. Everson, 124 N. Y. 319, 26 N. E. 911 (1891) ; Boulger v. Northern
41 N. D. 316, 171 N. W. 632 (1918) ; Sun Co. v. Wyatt, 48 Tex. Civ.

of propSimmons
Pac. Ry.,
App. 349

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

of which the principle case is an example. The fact that it may be
difficult to ascertain the damages caused by the wrongful act of each to
the aggregate result does not affect the rule, or make anyone liable for
the acts of others,0 the theory being that the uniting and mingling of the
separate torts do not make them joint. 7 However, the courts
have, in this species of litigation, generally allowed such independent
tort feasors to be joined in an equitable action for injunction although
not for damages.8
Some jurisdictions have made an exception to the general rule when
the acts of the defendants, although separate and distinct as to time and
place, culminate in producing a public nuisance which injures the person
or property of another. Here tort feasors are held jointly and severally
liable although they are not considered joint tort feasors.y North Carolina has gone to liberal limits in applying this exception through an application of an implied concert of design doctrine whereby such independent tort feasors are held jointly and severally liable if they knew
(1908) ; Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758 40 S. E. 2d 298 (1946) (pollu-

tion of stream) ; Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke o., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S. E. 265
(1920), reversing Day v. Louisville Coal & Coke Co., 60 W. Va. 27, 53 S. E. 776
(1906) (pollution of stream). See also Gendel, Torts: Concurrent But Independent
Wrongdoers: Joint Liability for Entire Damages, 19 CAL. L. REv. 630 (1931) ;
Wigmore, Joint Tort Feasors and Severence of Damages; Making the Innocent
Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REv. 458 (1923) ; RESTATEIENT, ToRTs
§ 881 (1938).
' Warren v. Parkhurst, 186 N. Y. 45, 78 N. E. 579 (1906). See note 3 supra.
a On the theory that it is not the injury but the wrongful act which creates Iiability see Dickens v. Yates, 194 Iowa 910, 188 N. E. 948 (1922); Johnson v.
Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451, 247 N. W. 572 (1933).
' Miller v. Highland Ditch Co., 87 Cal. 430, 25 Pac. 550 (1891); Hillman v.
Newington, 57 Cal. 56 (1880); Johnson v. Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451, 247 N. W.
572 (1933). Warren v. Parkhurst, 186 N. Y. 45, 78 N. E. 579 (1906) ; Evans v.
W. & W. Ry., 96 N. C. 45, 1 S. E. 529 (1886); Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh &
L. E. R. Co., 263 Pa. 294, 106 Atd. 724 (1919); Snavely v. Goldendale, 10 Wash.
2d 453, 117 P. 2d 221 (1941) ; Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595,
102 S.E. 265 (1920).
'West Muncie Strawboard Co. v. Slack, 164 Ind. 21, 72 N. E. 879 (1904) (decided on the theory that if one places himself in opposition to the entire community by performing acts which in combination with the independent wrongful
acts of others creates a public nuisance, he is in no position to assert he should
not be held responsible except for the actual loss his acts have occasioned) ; Valparaiso v. Moffitt, 12 Ind. App. 250, 39 N. E. 909 (1895) ; Simmons v. Everson,
124 N. Y. 319, 26 N. E. 911 (1891). Contra: Tackaberry Co v. Sioux City Service
Co., 154 Iowa 358, 132 N. W 945 (1911) (holding such a distinction too fine to be
made) ; Mansfield v. Brister, 76 Ohio St. Rep. 270, 81 N. E. 631 (1906) ; Mitchell
Realty Co. v. West Allis, 184 Wisc. 352, 199 N. W. 390 (1924).
However, where the negligence of a municipality and an individual combine
to produce a danger to travelers on a public street, highway or sidewalk, there
is generally joint and several liability. Hill v. Way, 117 Conn. 359, 168 At. 1
(1933) ; Waller v. Ross, 100 Minn. 7, 110 N. W. 252 (1907) ; Bowman v. Greensboro, 190 N. C. 611, 130 S. E. 502 (1925); Dillon v. Raleigh, 124 N. C. 184, 32
S. E. 548 (1899) ; Starcher v. South Penn. Co., 81 W. Va. 587, 95 S. E. 28 (1918).
But see Brown v. Louisburg and Ponton, 126 N. C. 701, 36 S. E. 166 (1900).
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or should have known that their independent acts would create a nui0
sance.'
The courts have also alleviated some of the harshness of the general
rule by finding joint and several liability where the independent negligent acts of two or more persons combine to produce a single injury if
it is impossible to apportion the amount of damage resulting from the individual acts." Likewise, the courts have generally held tort feasors
jointly liable for libel, 1 2 slander,' 3 assault and battery,' 4 and alienation
of affections,15 provided that conspiracy or unity of purpose is alleged
and proved.
In recent years a vast number of cases have arisen which involved
injury to third persons or damage to their property due to the concurring negligence of drivers of automobiles-another instance where the
negligence of one is not sufficient to produce the entire injury.' 6 Here
also, the weight of authority has departed from the general rule by hold1

oThis point was discussed but not applied in Symmes v. Prairie Pebble Phosphate Co., 66 Fla. 27, 63 So. 1 (1913); In Lineberger v. Gastonia, 196 N. C.
445, 146 S. E. 79 (1929), the leading case on this point in North Carolina, each
defendant emptied sewage into a stream above plaintiff's land. See also Moses v.
Morganton, 192 N. C. 102, 133 S.E. 421 (1926).
1 Covello v. Baumsteiger, 66 Cal. App. Dec. 54, 1 P. 2d 484 (1931). Truitner
v. Knight, 83 Cal. App. 655, 257 Pac. 447 (1927) (collision between two automobiles) ; Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co., 158 Cal. 499, 111 Pac. 534
(1910) (plaintiff was injured as a result of the gas company's negligence in repairing a leak, and another's negligence in lighting a stove).
" Howe v. Bradstreet Co., 135 Ga. 564, 69 S. E. 1082 (1911) (no joint liability where the libel of one is republished by another) ; Sourbien v. Brown, 188
Ind. 554, 123 N. E. 802 (1919) (person who composes and reduces to writing a
libelous article and publishes it or if another gets possession of it, either with
or without his consent, and publishes it, such publication makes the original composer liable for all damages occasioned by the publication, the two being jointly
and severally liable) ; Montgomery v. Dennison, 363 Pa. 255, 69 A. 2d 520 (1949).
"'Horn v. Ruess, 72 Ariz. 132, 231 P. 2d 756 (1951) ; Yocum v. Husted, 185
Iowa 119, 167 N. W. 663 (1918); Duquesne Distributing Co. v. Greenbaum, 135
Ky. 182, 121 S. W. 1026 (1909) ; Rice v. McAdams, 149 N. C. 29, 62 S. E. 774
(1908) ; Blake v. Smith, 19 R. I. 476, 34 Atl. 995 (1896) ; Standsberry v. McKenzie, 192 Tenn. 638, 241 S.W. 2d 600 (1951) ; Kellar v. Jones, 63 W. Va. 139,
59 S.E. 939 (1907).
" Glenn v. Chenowth, 71 Ariz. 271, 226 P. 2d 165 (1952) : Dickson v. Yates,
194 Iowa 910, 188 N. W. 948 (1922) (distinguishes between the terms "concurrent'
acts and joint!' acts, the latter implying the idea of an intent uniting the parties
in a common act or purpose). Acts may be concurrent with those of another,
but with no unity of intent. Wrabek v. Suchomel, 145 Minn. 468, 177 N. W.
764 (1920); Schafer v. Ostmann, 148 Mo. App. 644, 129 S. W. 63 (1910) (based
on the theory that assault and battery is a wilful tort); Garret v. Garret, 228
N. C. 530, 46 S.E. 2d 302 (1948).
" Heisler v. Heisler, 151 Iowa 502, 131 N. W. 676 (1911) : Barton v. Barton,
119 Mo. App. 507, 94 S. W. 574 (1906). These courts distinguish between intentional and negligent torts.
"oThese cases usually arise from two factual situations-a person is struck and
injured as a result of the negligence of one driver and immediately thereafter is
injured through the negligence of a second driver before he can be removed to a
place of safety; or a passenger is injured in a collision between the car in which
he is riding and a second vehicle-both drivers being negligent.
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ing joint liability. 17 It is immaterial that the conduct of one driver was
seriously wrongful while that of the other was mere negligence if the
negligence of each was the proximate, concurring cause of the injury;
for the negligence
of one will not be allowed to exonerate the negligence
8
of the other.'
Unique fact situations have arisen in the second category of cases
presenting the problem of joint and several liability, viz, where the acts
of two or more wrongdoers combine to produce a single injury, the act
of one alone being sufficient to produce the entire injury. The general
rule, however, appears to be that the tort feasors are jointly and severally
liable since apportionment is usually impossible.1 The theory is that
none of the wrongdoers should complain since he would have caused the
20
same damage had the other defendants not been involved.
For example, the general rule has been applied in the few' cases litigated involving the spread of fires originating through the separafe negligent acts of two or more wrongdoers, the fires in the course of their
spread combining to cause injury to the plaintiff's property. 21 Here
the parties have been held jointly and severally liable on the theory that
if the defendant's negligence isa substantial and material factor in causing injury, then he is liable notwithstanding the fact that the negligence
of the other with which his negligence combined would have caused
the injury anyway.22
17 Reed v. Mai, 171 Kan. 169, 231 P. 2d 227 (1951) ; Kapla v. Lehti, 225 Minn.
,325, 30 N. W. 2d 685 (1948); Stark v. Turner 154 Neb. 268 47 N. W. 2d 569
(1951) (passenger injured in a collision) ; Gelsmine v. Vignale, 11 N. J. Super.

481, 178 A. 2d 602 (1951) ; Downing v. Dillard, 55 N. Mex. 267, 232 P. 2d 140
(1951) (passenger injured in a collision) ; Bechtler v. Bracken, 218 N. C. 515,
11 S. E. 2d 721 (1940) (passenger killed in a collision) ; Myers v. Southern Public
Utilities Co., 208 N. C. 293, 180 S. E. 694 (1935) (pedestrian injured when two
vehicles collided) ; West v. Collins Baking Co., 208 N. C. 526, 181 S. E. 551 (1935)
(plaintiff's intestate struck and injured as a result of the negligence of the driver
-of a car, and while attempting to arise was struck and further injured by a
truck driven by the co-defendant). See also White v. Carolina Realty Co., 182
N. C. 536, 109 S. E. 564 (1921).
1"

See note 17 supra.

"Oulighan v. Butler, 189 Mass. 287, 75 N. E. 726 (1905)

(nitroglycerin

soaked into a floor causing an explosion, and at the same time a nearby wagon
loaded with gunpowder exploded) ; Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N. E.
69 (1903) (two motorcyclists passed simultaneously on either side of a wagon,
the noise frightening plaintiff's horses). See also Gendel, Torts: Concurrent But
Independent Wrongdoers: Joint Liability for Entire Damages, 19 CAL. L. Rsv. 630

(1931).
",Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N. E. 69 (1903).
21 Anderson v. Minneapolis, 146 Minn. 450, 179 N. W. 45 (1920) (defendant's
fire combined with a fire of unknown origin); McClellan v. St. Paul Ry.,
58 Minn. 104, 59 N. W. 978 (1894) (defendant's fire combined with that set by

another) ; Seckerson v. Sinclair, 24 N. D. 625, 140 N. W. 239 (1913)

(defendant's

fire combined with that originating on property of third person);

Minneapolis, 98 Wis. 624, 74 N. W. 561 (1898)

Cook v.

(defendant's fire combined with

a fire having no responsible origin).
"Anderson v. Minneapolis, 146 Minn. 450, 179 N. W. 45 (1920) ; McClellan v.
St. Paul Ry., 58 Minn. 104, 59 N. W. 978 (1894).
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In line with the general rule in this category the courts have generally found joint and several liability, in the absence of showing whose
act caused the injury, where two or more persons are guilty of similar
acts of misconduct one of which alone causes the injury. This question
has arisen most frequently in instances where the wrongdoers were using firearms in the course of a hunting expedition or while otherwise
engaged in the negligent use of the weapons.2 The theory of the holdings is not that they were acting in concert, but that to hold otherwise
would be to exonerate both from liability although each is negligent and
24
the injury resulted from such negligence.
An attempt has been made to extend the rule applied in the firearms
cases in order to impose joint and several liability where there is but
one single injury and one single act of negligence committed by the
defendants, and the proof is not clear as to which is guilty of the
single negligent act. In the few cases giving rise to this question the
courts have held that there can be no joint and several liability but that
25
it must be determined whose was the negligent act.
In conclusion, with regard to the positions which the courts have taken
in the more common joint tort feasor situations, it seems that the area
in which a more liberal attitude towards holding joint and several liability is most needed is in that class of cases illustrated by the Texas
case, 26 where the majority hold "separate liability" and thus impose the
almost impossible task upon the injured party of proving the proportionate damage chargable to each defendant's act.2 7 Realizing that to place
such a burden on the injured party is to leave him remediless, the Texas
court has seen fit to break away from the majority in an attempt to substitute greater justice for precedent, 28 and directly overrules the prior
" Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P. 2d 1 (1948)

(plaintiff and two

defendants were hunting when the defendants shot at the same time in the plaintiff's direction); Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N. E. 237 (1912) (the
defendantts were engaged in racing their automobiles and passed one on each
side of a wagon) ; Benson v. Ross, 143 Mich. 452. 106 N. W. 1120 (1906) ; Moore
v. Foster, 182 Miss. 15, 180 So. 73 (1938) (action against one constable for
shooting the plaintiff while he was fleeing where it was admitted that another constable also shot). Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666 (1926) (two
hunters fired across the highway hitting a traveler).
" See note 23 svPra.
2 Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Nall, 178 Ky. 33, 198 S. W. 745 (1917)
(question as to which defendant's employees left a floor in a dangerous condition) ; Haley v. Calef, 28 R. I. 332, 67 Atl. 323 (1907) (a bridge connecting
tvo towns, each town responsible for keeping its side in safe condition, was defective and caused plaintiff's injury).
"' Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S. W. 2d 731 (Tex.
1952).
See note 5 supra.
28 "Our courts seem to have embraced the philosophy, inherent in this class of
decisions, that it is better that the injured party lose all his damages than that any
of several wrongdoers should pay more of the damages than he individually and
separately caused. If such has been the law, from the standpoint of justice it
should not have been; if it is the law now, it will not be hereafter." Landers
v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S. W. 2d 731, 734 (Tex. 1952).
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29

leading Texas case on this point.
It is submitted that if the acts result in separate and distinct injuries, then each wrongdoer should be
liable only to the extent of the damage caused by his acts. But if the
combined results, though absent concert of design, result in a single
and indivisible injury, the liability should be entire. The true -distinction
should be made between injuries which are divisible and those which are
indivisible.3 0
R. DAPHENE LEDFORD
Trusts-Constructive Trust-Breach of Oral Agreement Between
Persons in Confidential Relationship
In the majority of those American jurisdictions requiring trusts of
land to be in writing to be enforceable,' mere refusal or failure of a
grantee of land upon an oral trust to carry out the terms of the trust is
not a sufficient basis for a constructive trust to prevent unjust enrichment.2
Where, however, it is found that such a refusal or failure constitutes
the breach of a confidential relationship between the grantee and the
grantor, these courts have not hesitated to declare the grantee a constructive trustee.3 In an A-to-B-for-A situation, B is said to hold on
"Sun Oil Co. v, Robicheaux, 23 S.W. 2d (Tex. 1930).
" Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEX. L. Rv.399, 420 (1939).
'About two-thirds of the American states have statutes similar to the seventh
section of the early English Statute of Frauds. In at least two others, the trust
section is assumed to be a part of the common law. The parol evidence rule or the
contracts section has prevented enforcement of oral trusts in some of the remaining jurisdictions.
' "However inequitable and morally apprehensible it may be that property conveyed upon an express oral trust should be retained in violation of the agreement, a trust may not, under those circumstances, be ingrafted upon a deed absolute in its terms, because if that were the rule deeds would no longer be valuable
as muniments of title." Silvers v. Howard, 106 Kan. 762, 768, 190 Pac. 1, 4 (1920).
The leading case in the A-to-B-for-A situations is Patton v. Beecher, 62 Ala.
579, 593 (1878), in which the court said, "In any and every case, in which
the court is called to enforce a trust, there must be a repudiation of it, or an inability from accident to perform it. If the repudiation is a fraud, which justifies
interference in opposition to the words and spirit of the statute, the sphere of
operation of the statute is practically limited to breaches from accident, and no
reason can be assigned for the limitation." For similar view, see Reynolds v.
Reynolds, 121 Conn. 153, 183 AtI. 394 (1936); Goff v. Goff, 98 Kan. 201, 158
Pac. 26 (1916); Henderson v. Murray, 108 Minn. 76, 121 N. W. 214 (1908);
Brown v. Murray, 94 N. J. Eq. 125, 118 AtI. 534 (Ch. 1922) ; Kane v. Kane, 134
Ore. 79, 291 Pac. 785 (1930); Broadway Building Co. v. Salafia, 47 R. I. 263,
132 AtI. 527 (1926) ; Pacheco v. Mello, 139 Wash. 566, 247 Pac. 927 (1927).
The same, of course, is true in the A-to-B-for-C cases. E.g., Bartlett v. Bartlett, 221 Ala. 578, 130 So. 194 (1930) ; Ampeuro v. Luce, 68 Cal. App. 811, 157
P. 2d 899 (1945) ; Keller v. Joseph, 329 Ill. 148, 160 N. E. 117 (1928) ; Westphal
v. Heckman, 185 Ind. 88, 113 N. E. 299 (1916).
In some jurisdictions, the rule that equity will raise a constructive trust upon the
mere refusal of a grantee to perform an oral trust for the benefit of the grantor
or a third person has been adopted by statute. See Uniform Trusts Act, § 16;
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 36-39 (1950).
' "The reason for the rule is that, when a person assumes a confidential relation-
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constructive trust for A, the grantor. 4 And in the A-to-B-for-C cases,

the courts have decreed a constructive trust in favor of C.5 In so decreeing, the courts are not seeking to carry out the original express
intentions of the parties.

Rather, they are attempting to prevent the

grantee's enrichment through misconduct more sinister than mere, breach
of contract.

But the courts have, in general, refused to set down any specifications
as to just what constitutes a "confidential relationship" for this purpose.

This lack of definiteness may well be intentional since it permits a flexibility which equity needs to meet variant situations.

As a result, the

meaning of the term "confidential relationship" in these cases is very
nebulous.

In the conventional confidential relatiorxhip where there exists
a client-attorney, principal-agent, partner-partner or other fiduciary status between the grantor and the grantee, the grantee is usually
more than morally bound to act in the best interest of the grantor and
the grantor is justified in imposing special trust and confidence in the
grantee's fidelity.6 Where only a family or other close personal relaship to another, it would be a flagrant injustice to permit the confidence to be
betrayed and equity will not allow the betrayer to invoke the Statute of Frauds
to sustain a transaction tainted with such bad faith.' Grimes v. Grimes, 184 Md.
59, 63, 40 Atl. 2d 58, 61 (1944).
"The absence of a formal writing grew out
of the very confidence and trust, and was occasioned by it." Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 145 N. Y. 313, 318, 39 N. E. 1067, 1068 (1895).
The eighth section of the English Statute of Frauds expressly excludes from
the application of the seventh section the cases of trusts of land which "arise
or result by the implication or construction of law." 29 Chas. II, c. 3 § VIII
(1677).
'Bradley Company v. Bradley, 37 Cal. App. 263, 173 Pac. 1011 (1918);
Silvers v. Howard, 106 Kan. 762, 190 Pac. 1 (1920) (constructive trust for the
heirs of A); Hatcher v. Hatcher, 264 Pa. 105, 107 Atl. 660 (1919) (for A's
residuary legatees).
'A decree in favor of the beneficiary would seem to be taking the constructive
trust doctrines too far. The majority of the courts, however, "wink' at the
Statute of Frauds even here and grant a judgment for the beneficiary on the
ground that in breaching the confidential relationship with his grantor, the grantee
has committed a tort on the beneficiary. Newton v. Newton, 214 Ky. 278, 283
S. W. 83 (1926) (father to son for his brothers and sisters, they were allowed
to benefit from the constructive trust) ; Wright v. Logan, 179 Okla. 350, 65 P. 2d
1217 (1937) (father and mother to son for brothers and sisters) ; Reigel v. Wood,
110 Okla. 279, 229 Pac. 556 (1924) (father to son for son, sisters and brothers) ;
Boggs v. Yates, 101 W. Va. 407, 132 S. E. 876 (1926) (father to daughter for
mother, trust for mother). But cf. Harney v. Harney, 170 Minn. 479, 213 N. W.
38 (1927) (fiduciary relationship can be taken advantage of only by grantor).
For the North Carolina situation, see note 12 infra.
'Stromerson v. Averill, -Cal.-,
133 P. 2d 617 (1943) (principal to agent) ;
Kimball v. Tripp, 136 Cal. 631, 69 Pac. 428 (1902) (considered partners);
Wood v. White, 123 Me. 139, 122 Atl. 177 (1923)
(partners); O'Day
v. Annex Realty Company, 269 Mo. 248, 191 S. W. 41 (1916) (principal to agent) ;
Koeford v. Thompson, 73 Neb. 128, 102 N. W. 208 (1905) (partner to partner) ;
Schwartzle v. Dale, 54 N. W. 2d 361 (N. D. 1952) (principal to agent). In
the client to attorney case, a trust has been decreed without an oral trust or
promise to reconvey. Davis v. Hendrix, 192 Ala. 215, 68 So. 863 (1915);
Bartholomew v. Guthrie, 71 Kan. 705, 81 Pac. 491 (1905).
See Noble v. Noble,
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tionship exists, no confidential relationship is necessarily involved.
While some courts have taken this view and have refused to find that
such a closeness alone warrants grantor confidence, 7 most of the decisions have deemed the existence of such a family or close personal
relationship to be a determinative factor.8
In many cases, a transferee's dominance or superiority of position
whether the result of disparity of age, education, business acumen, or
physical or mental condition, may be emphasized.0 In others, the fact
255 Ill. 629, 99 N. E. 631 (1912) where a sister conveyed to her brother who was
a lawyer.
'Jones v. Gachot, 217 Ark. 462, 230 S. W. 2d 937 (1950) (aunt to nephew);
Smith v. Mason, 122 Cal. 426, 55 Pac. 143 (1898) (father to daughter); Winkelman v. Winkelman, 307 Ill. 249, 138 N. E. 637 (1923) (parent to child); Biggins
v. Biggins, 133 Ill. 211, 24 N. E. 516 (1890) (brother to sister); Gregory v.
Bowlsky, 115 Iowa 327, 88 N. W. 822 (1902) (parent to child) ; Bolin v. Krengel,
116 Kan. 459, 227 Pac. 266 (1924) (father to foster son); Silvers v. Howard,
106 Kan. 762, 190 Pac. 1 (1920) (son to mother); Goff v. Goff, 98 Kan. 201,
158 Pac. 26 (1916) (father to son) ; Sloan v. McCartney, 58 Misc. 75, 108 N. Y.
Supp. 840 (Sup. Ct. 1908) (parent to child); Wolfskill v. Wells, 154 Mo. App.
302, 134 S. W. 51 (1911) (father to son); Kiser v. Sullivan, 106 Neb. 454, 184
N. W. 93 (1921) (daughter to father). For additional cases, see 1 Sco'r, TRUSTS
§§ 44.2,
45.2 (1st ed. 1939).
8
Stenberger v. Steinberger, 60 Cal. App. 2d 116, 140 P. 2d 31 (1943) (nephew
to uncle); Robertson v. Summeril, 39 Cal. App. 2d 62, 102 P. 2d 347 (1940)
(son to mother) ; Cole v. Manning, 79 Cal. App. 55, 248 Pac. 1065 (1926) (confidential relationship arose out of exchange of promises to marry, meritricious
relationship was ignored) ; Logan v. Logan, 68 Cal. App. 448, 229 Pac. 993 (1924)
(brother to brother) ; Bradley Co. v. Bradley, 165 Cal. 237, 131 Pac. 750 (1913)
kparties betrothed); Lauricella v. Lauricella, 161 Cal. 61, 118 Pac. 430 (1911)
(husband to wife); Jones v. Jones. 140 Cal. 587, 74 Pac. 143 (1903) (mother to
daughter) ; Brison v. Brison, 75 Cal. 525, 17 Pac. 689 (1888) (husband to wife) ;
Wilder v. Wilder, 138 Ga. 573, 75 S. E. 654 (1912) (mother to son); Hanger v.
Hess, 49 Idaho 325, 288 Pac. 160 (1930) (grantor to housekeeper); Shortridge
v. Shortridge, 207 Ky. 790, 270 S. W. 47 (1925) (husband to wife) ; Rice v. Rice,
184 Md. 403, 41 AtI. 2d 371 (1945) (father to son) ; Levine v. Schafer, 184 Md.
205, 40 A. 2d 324 (1944) (father to son); Lipp v. Lipp, 158 Md. 207, 148 Atl.
531 (1930) (mother to son); Dielfelder v. Winterling, 150 Md. 626, 133 Atl. 825
(1926) (mother to daughter); Wilmer v. Dunn, 133 Md. 354, 105 Ati. 319 (1918)
(wife to husband for children) ; O'Shea v. O'Shea, 143 Neb. 843, 11 N. W. 2d 540
(1943) (brother to sister) ; Nelson v. Seevers, 143 Neb. 522, 10 N. W. 2d 349
(1943) (father to son-in-law) ; Bowler v. Curler, 21 Nev. 158, 26 Pac. 226 (1891)
(son to father-in-law) ; Frick v. Cone, 160 Misc. 450, 290 N. Y. Supp. 592 (Sup.
Ct. 1936) (husband to wife) ; Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N. Y. 237, 167 N. E. 428
(1929) (husband to wife) ; Aherns v. Jones, 169 N. Y. 555, 62 N. E. 666 (1902)
(husband to wife) ; Hauson v. Svarerud, 18 N. D. 556, 120 N. W. 550 (1909) ;
Trimble v. Bales, 169 Okla. 228, 36 P. 2d 861 (1934) (sister-in-law to brother-inlaw) ; Bryant v. Mahon, 130 Okla. 67, 264 Pac. 811 (1927) (friend to friend) ;
Lalich v. Bankovsky, 350 Pa. 441, 39 A. 2d 514 (1944) (brother to sister);
Landrum v. Landrum, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 175 N. W. 366 (1919) (father to son).
For additional cases, see 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 44.2, 45.2 (1st ed. 1939).
'Mead v. Mead, 41 Cal. App. 280, 182 Pac. 761 (1919) (grantee was skilled
in business transactions) ; Willats v. Bosworth, 33 Cal. App. 710, 166 Pac. 357
(1917) (mother to son who was skilled in business affairs); Cooney v. Glynn,
157 Cal. 583, 108 Pac. 506 (1910) (mother to son, mother on deathbed) ; Nervis v.
Topker, 121 Iowa 433, 96 N. W. 905 (1903) ; Staab v. Staab, 158 Kan. 69, 145 P. 2d
447 (1944) (aged and uneducated father to his son) ; Henderson v. Murray, 108
Minn. 76, 121 N. W. 214 (1909) (grantor was 70 years old, grantee was priest
of grantor's church) ; Harrington v. Schiller, 231 N. Y. 278, 132 N. E. 89 (1921)
(mother to daughter, who was skilled in business affairs); Reigel v. Wood, 110
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that the grantee even in good faith at the time of the conveyance had
actually induced it has been a contributory circumstance. 10
On the other hand, an improper motive on the part of the grantor in
making the transfer has prevented the intervention of equity."
North Carolina has no trust section of the Statute of Frauds. While
an oral trust for a third party is therefore enforceable, 12 our court has
refused to engraft an oral trust for the grantor upon an absolute deed
because of the parol evidence rule.' 8 However, in Sorrell v. Sorrell,'4
the constructive trust device was employed in this A-to-B-for-A situation when the court found that a fiduciary relationship had been
abused. 1 In that leading case, the grantee was both nephew and busiOkla. 279, 229 Pac. 556 (1924) (grantor was mentally sick) ; Parrish v. Parrish, 33
Ore. 486, 54 Pac. 352 (1898) (grantor was feeble and old); Rozell v. Van-

syckle, 11 Wash. 79, 39 Pac. 270 (1895) (grantor was old, ignorant, illiterate,
mentally weak, easily alarmed, easily imposed upon).
' 0 Linahan v. Linahan, 131 Conn. 307, 39 A. 2d 895 (1944); In re Fisk 81
Conn. 433, 71 Atl. 559 (1908) ; Miller v. Miller, 266 Ill. 522, 107 N. E. 821 (1915) ;
Larmon v. Knight, 140 Ill. 232, 29 N. E. 1116 (1892) ; Fischbeck v. Gross, 112 Ill.
208 (1884); Jasinski v. Stanhowski, 145 Md. 58, 125 AUt. 684 (1924); Huffine v.
Lincoln, 52 Mont. 585, 160 Pac. 820 (1916); Hartman v. Loverick, 227 Wisc.

6, 277 N. W. 641 (1938).
" Drake v. Thompson, 14 F. 2d 933 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied 273 U. S.
744 (1927) (transfer to defraud creditors); MacRae v. MacRae, 37 Ariz. 307,
294 Pac. 280 (1930) (parties in pari delicto, no constructive trust when transfer
admittedly made to defraud creditors); Blaine v. Krysowaty, 135 N. J. Eq. 355,
38 A. 2d 859 (Ch. 1944) (grantor seeking to avoid debt) ; Robertson v. Sayre,
134 N. Y. 97, 31 N. E. 250 (1892) (title in name of grantee in order to defraud
creditors) ; Kalinowski v. McLeny, 68 Wash. 681, 123 Pac. 1074 (1902) (allowed
recovery to creditors of grantee of admittedly fraudulent conveyance).
See
Bartos v. Bartos, 138 Misc. 117, 244 N. Y. Supp. 713 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (evidence
insufficient to prove that conveyance in defraud of creditors); Tiedemann v.
Tiedemann, 115 Misc. 462, 189 N. Y. Supp. 931 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (where conveyance to wife upon threat of suit, motive not considered important).
"Taylor v. Addington, 222 N. C. 393, 23 S. E. 2d 318 (1942) ; Reynolds v.
Morton, 205 N. C. 491, 171 S. E. 781 (1933) ; Rush v. McPherson, 176 N. C. 562,
97 S. E. 613 (1918) ; Boone v. Lee, 175 N. C. 383, 95 S. E. 659 (1918) ; Lutz v.
Hoyle, 167 N. C. 632, 83 S. E. 749 (1914); Ricks v. Wilson, 154 N. C. 282, 70
S. E. 476 (1911) ; Taylor v. Wahab, 154 N. C. 219, 70 S. E. 173 (1911) ; Avery
v. Stewart, 136 N. C. 426, 48 S. E. 775 (1904) ; Sykes v. Boone, 132 N. C. 199,
43 S. E. 645 (1903) ; Owens v. Williams, 130 N. C. 165, 41 S. E. 93 (1902).
"While in the leading case of Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N. C. 222, 63 S. E.
1028 (1909) the grantor was seeking to defraud his wife, the question of motive
apparently does not enter into the court's decisions in this situation. See, e. g.,
Bass v. Bass, 229 N. C. 171, 48 S. E. 2d 48 (1948) ; Poston v. Poston, 228 N. C.
202, 44 S. E. 2d 881 (1947) ; Carlisle v. Carlisle, 225 N. C. 462, 35 S. E. 2d 418
(1945) ; Loftin v. Kornegay, 225 N. C. 490, 35 S. E. 2d 607 (1945) ; Atkinson v.
Atkinson, 225 N. C. 120, 33 S. E. 2d 666 (1945) ; Winner v. Winner, 222 N. C.
414, 23 S. E. 2d 251 (1942) ; Penland v. Wells, 201 N. C. 173, 159 S. E. 423 (1931).
, 198 N. C. 460, 152 S. E. 157 (1930).
6 Id. at 464, 152 S. E. 157, 160, the court said, "The evidence tended to show
an active trust relationship existing between the parties, and that the conveyance
of the land on 24 December, 1915, by the plaintiff to the defendant was in pursuance of a general scheme or agreement between the parties for working out and
liquidating the indebtedness owed by the plaintiff. Hence, a fiduciary relationship
existed between the parties, and while there was neither allegation nor evidence
of actual fraud, the law presumes fraud in transactions where confidential relationships existed between the parties."
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ness manager of the piaintiff grantor. The North Carolina court has
recently held that the question of whether a confidential relationship
existed is one for the jury.16 No criteria for a finding of such a relationship was laid down. Whether or not our court will now require
the conventional fiduciary basis for a confidential relationship which was
17
present in the Sorrell case is an open question.
There might be two solutions to the uncertainties arising in confidential relationship cases. In the first place, the courts could be more
specific in their concept of what is considered such a relationship. A
technical fiduciary relationship might be insisted upon.' 8 One authority
would have the courts require a clear showing of a pre-existing relation
of trust and confidence. 19 Any such requirements would undoubtedly
clarify the present situation and in addition bolster the significance of
the Statute of Frauds provisions. On the other hand, the "confidential
relationship" exception was developed by the courts to relieve a trusting
grantor or beneficiary from the harsh consequences of the majority rule.
It would seem that, if the criteria for such a relationship were predetermined and fixed, the effectiveness of the exception in accomplishing
the result sought by the courts would be greatly limited.
The second answer has been recommended by authorities for many
years. 20 They argue that the fundamental question involved is one of
balancing the policy of the Statute of Frauds against the prevention of
unjust enrichment, and that, if the court is adequately convinced of the
existence of an agreement between the parties as the substantial price for
the land, the prevention of unjust enrichment should prevail. The English courts and a minority of the Amercan jurisdictions have permitted
"Crews v. Crews, 236 N. C. 528, -S. E. 2d- (1952).
17 i Atkins v. Withers, 94 N. C. 581, 590 (1885), the court stated, "The cases
in which the law wvill presume fraud, arising from the confidential relations of the
parties to a contract, are, executors and administrators, guardian and ward,
trustees and cestui que trust, principal and agent, brokers, factors, etc., mortgagor
and mortgagee, attorneys and clients, and to those have been added, we think
very appropriately, husband and wife." This sentence was cited in the Sorrell case
and is indicative of the instances where our court will find a confidential relationship. But ef. Winner v. Winner, 222 N. C. 414, 23 S. E. 2d 251 (1942), where a
father-to-son transfer was held not sufficient to raise a constructive trust.
" As will be seen upon an examination of the cases, the courts have used the
words "fiduciary" and "confidential" interchangeably. However, that relationship

wherein one party is the legal representative of the other whether by agreement
between the parties or otherwise could be termed "fiduciary" in contrast to those
circumstances where only a moral duty exists.
1d3 BOGERT, TRusTs AND TRusTEEs §§ 482, 496 (2nd ed. 1935); Bogert, Confidential Relations and Unenforceable Express Trusts, 13 CORNELL L. Q.

237 (1927).
113 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTES § 497 (2nd ed. 1935); 1 Scowt, TRUSTS
§§ 44.2, 45.2, 55.9 (1st ed. 1939); Ames, Constructive Trusts Based Upon the
Breach of an Express Oral Trust of Land, 20 HARV. L. R-Fy. 549 (1907);
Costigan, Trusts Based on Oral Promises, 12 Micia. L. REv. 423, 515 (1914);
Stone, Resulting Trusts and the Statute of Frauds, 6 COL. L. Rav. 327 (1906).
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the grantor a right to restitution on this basis alone. 21 Such a view seems
to get to the crux of the problem without resorting to the "confidential
relationship" exception.
2But

WALLACE ASHLEY, JR.
the English rule as pronounced in Davies v. Otty, 35 Beav. 208, 55

Eng. Rep. 875 (1865), and Haigh v. Kaye, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 409 (1872), has not
been given its full sweep in America even in those jurisdictions which profess to
stress the unjust enrichment through breach of agreement. Examination of those
American decisions supporting the English view reveals, that there is usually present a confidential relationship which could itself have justified the constructive
trust. In effect then, our "liberal" courts seem to be extending the "constructive
fraud" doctrine to include mere breach of an oral agreement when they are partly
motivated by the confidential relation factor. E. g., Mandley v. Bacher, 73 App.
D. C. 412, 121 F. 2d 875 (1941) ; Steinberger v. Steinberger, 60 Cal. App. 2d 116,
140 P. 2d 31 (1933); Robertson v. Summeril, 39 Cal. App. 2d 62, 102 P. 2d 347
(1940) ; Gilbert v. Cohn, 374 Ill. 452, 30 N. E. 2d 19 (1940) ; Becker v. Neurath,
149 Ky. 421, 149 S. W. 857 (1912); Ruhe v. Ruhe, 113 Md. 595, 77 At. 797
(1910) ; Androscoggin Co. Savings Bank v. Tracy, 115 Me. 433, 99 Atl. 257 (1916) ;
Eastmond v. Eastmond, 2 N. J. Super. 529, 64 A. 2d 901 (1949) ; Moses v. Moses,
140 N. J. Eq. 575, 53 A. 2d 805 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947).
Cf. Justice Seawell's statements in Atkinson v. Atkinson, 225 N. C. 120, 126, 33
S. E. 2d 666, 671 (1945), where he makes it clear that any approach to the theory
of constructive trust via unjust enrichment should be made with caution, and
that such cannot be invoked "to broaden the basis of equity jurisdiction or to bring
within its cognizance situations which have heretofore escaped the comprehension
of its long recognized rules."

